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Article 
The Missing Pieces of Geoengineering 
Research Governance 
Albert C. Lin† 
  INTRODUCTION   
Geoengineering research is at a crossroads.1 With growing 
urgency, scientists have expressed interest in moving beyond 
computer modeling and laboratory trials.2 However, recent ef-
forts to conduct field experiments have encountered strong op-
position. The intensifying controversy points to the need to es-
tablish a system of geoengineering research governance. Two 
research projects that received substantial media attention—
the Stratospheric Particle Injection for Climate Engineering 
(SPICE) project, and an ocean fertilization experiment spon-
sored by a native Haida village in British Columbia—illustrate 
the concerns that geoengineering field research raises. 
The U.K. Research Councils commissioned the SPICE pro-
ject in 2010 to investigate the potential release of aerosols into 
 
†  Professor of Law, University of California Davis School of Law. 
Thanks to Dean Kevin Johnson, Associate Dean Vik Amar, and the U.C. Davis 
School of Law for financial support for this project, to Jesse Reynolds, Wil 
Burns, and participants at the Climate Engineering Conference 2014 and the 
Berkeley Environmental Law Colloquium for their thoughtful questions and 
comments, and to Rebecca LaGrandeur Harms for her research assistance. 
Copyright © 2016 by Albert C. Lin. 
 1. Geoengineering is a catch-all term for various proposed climate 
change policy responses that do not constitute reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions or adaptation. See Albert C. Lin, Geoengineering, in GLOBAL CLI-
MATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 715, 715 (Michael B. Gerrard & Jody Freeman 
eds., 2d ed. 2014); see also infra Part I.A (defining geoengineering and discuss-
ing examples). 
 2. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE INTERVENTION: RE-
FLECTING SUNLIGHT TO COOL EARTH 152 (2015) (recommending development 
of a research program on methods to modify the Earth’s reflectivity, including 
small-scale field experiments); Jane C.S. Long et al., Start Research on Cli-
mate Engineering, 518 NATURE 29, 30 (2015) (urging commencement of small-
scale outdoor experiments). 
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the stratosphere to block solar radiation.3 The project originally 
involved a modest field component in addition to desk-based 
and computer modeling work.4 In the field component, scien-
tists planned to spray 150 liters of water from a tethered bal-
loon and to observe the contraption’s movements under varying 
wind conditions.5 The experiment would have blocked virtually 
no solar radiation and carried little if any physical risks.6 Fur-
thermore, the experiment was subject to typical university re-
search oversight as well as additional review by a panel of sci-
entists and social scientists.7 Two key concerns nonetheless led 
to the field experiment’s cancellation.8 First, several project re-
searchers had filed a patent application for the experimental 
mechanism, prompting objections regarding their motives.9 Se-
cond, and more importantly, critics worried that the experi-
ment signified a growing commitment to geoengineering de-
ployment.10 In contrast to the investigation of basic scientific 
principles, research regarding a specific geoengineering tech-
nique takes place with an operational objective in mind: de-
ployment of the technique. Hastily moving forward with re-
search, it is feared, could enable eventual deployment without 
sufficient public discussion or informed deliberation by policy 
makers.11  
 
 3. See Aims and Background, SPICE, http://www.spice.ac.uk/about-us/ 
aims-and-background (last visited Apr. 16, 2016); see also Nick Pidgeon et al., 
Deliberating Stratospheric Aerosols for Climate Geoengineering and the SPICE 
Project, 3 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 451, 452 (2013). Aerosols are minute par-
ticles suspended in the atmosphere. See Atmospheric Aerosols: What Are They, 
and Why Are They So Important?, NASA, http://www.nasa.gov/centers/langley/ 
news/factsheets/Aerosols.html (last updated July 31, 2015). 
 4. Pidgeon et al., supra note 3. 
 5. See David E. Winickoff & Mark B. Brown, Time for a Government Ad-
visory Committee on Geoengineering Research, ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Summer 
2013, at 79, 80; see also Pidgeon et al., supra note 3. 
 6. See Winickoff & Brown, supra note 5; see also Pidgeon et al., supra 
note 3. 
 7. See Phil Macnaghten & Richard Owen, Good Governance for 
Geoengineering, 479 NATURE 293, 293 (2011); Winickoff & Brown, supra note 
5. This additional “Stagegate” review included a deliberative workshop with 
selected members of the public to gauge their response to the field experiment. 
Pidgeon et al., supra note 3. 
 8. See Winickoff & Brown, supra note 5; see also Jack Stilgoe et al., Pub-
lic Engagement with Biotechnologies Offers Lessons for the Governance of 
Geoengineering Research and Beyond, 11 PLOS BIOLOGY, no. 11, 2013, at 1, 2–
5. 
 9. See Winickoff & Brown, supra note 5. 
 10. See id.; see also Stilgoe et al., supra note 8, at 3. 
 11. See Stilgoe et al., supra note 8, at 5. 
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In the Haida experiment, the Haida tribe provided finan-
cial backing for an American businessman, Russ George, to 
dump over 100 tons of iron powder into international waters off 
the British Columbia coast.12 The Haida hoped that fertilizing 
the oceans with iron would stimulate the growth of plankton 
and in time boost the local salmon fishery.13 However, George’s 
comments and his history of promoting geoengineering re-
vealed a further, more controversial motive: to test whether 
ocean fertilization can sequester carbon from the atmosphere.14 
Once George publicly announced what he had done, experts ex-
pressed grave concerns.15 The experiment not only lacked prop-
er measurement and controls, but also took place without for-
mal international sanction.16 Although it is contested whether 
the experiment violated domestic or international law, the inci-
dent triggered a Canadian government investigation, as well as 
allegations that the Canadian government itself was complicit 
in the experiment.17 The controversy has magnified the reluc-
 
 12. See David Biello, Can Controversial Ocean Iron Fertilization Save 
Salmon?, SCI. AM. (Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/ 
fertilizing-ocean-with-iron-to-save-salmon-and-earn-money. 
 13. See Joshua Learn, Are Record Salmon Runs in the Northwest the Re-
sult of a Controversial CO2 Reduction Scheme?, E&E PUB. (Nov. 12, 2014), 
http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060008722. 
 14. See Henry Fountain, A Rogue Climate Experiment Has Ocean Experts 
Outraged, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2012, at A1 (noting that George had previously 
proposed a similar iron fertilization project for the purpose of selling carbon 
offsets); Mark Hume & Ian Bailey, Businessman Russ George Defends Experi-
ment Seeding Pacific with Iron Sulphate, GLOBE & MAIL (Oct. 19, 2012), http:// 
www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/businessman-russ-george 
-defends-experiment-seeding-pacific-with-iron-sulphate/article4622528/ (re-
porting George’s statements that “he is out to save the world’s oceans and 
demonstrate how to halt global warming”). 
 15. See Fountain, supra note 14. The Haida experiment followed earlier 
and similarly controversial ocean fertilization experiments. See Aaron Strong 
et al., Ocean Fertilization: Time To Move On, 461 NATURE 347, 348 (2009). 
 16. Edward A. Parson & David W. Keith, End the Deadlock on Govern-
ance of Geoengineering Research, 339 SCIENCE 1278, 1278 (2013). 
 17. See Joshua Learn, Legal Mess Hampers Understanding of a Major 
CO2 Sequestration Test, E&E PUB. (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/ 
stories/1060008800 (discussing a search of Haida offices); Dene Moore, Ocean 
Fertilization Experiment Loses in B.C. Court; Charges Now Likely, GLOBE & 
MAIL (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/ 
ocean-fertilization-experiment-loses-in-bc-court-charges-now-likely/article 
16672031 (reporting that the court dismissed the Haida’s application to de-
clare the alleged offenses unenforceable and to enjoin further investigation by 
the Canadian environmental agency); West Coast Ocean Fertilization Project 
Defended, CBC NEWS (Oct. 19, 2012), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british 
-columbia/west-coast-ocean-fertilization-project-defended-1.1226125 (recount-
ing project leaders’ contentions that they did not violate Canadian or interna-
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tance of potential funders to support basic research in this area 
and raised anxieties regarding rogue geoengineering field ex-
periments.18  
The fact that these field experiments generated substantial 
controversy despite their limited scope suggests various con-
cerns. A number of these concerns cluster around the theme of 
a growing distrust of geoengineering researchers. The Haida 
incident reinforces the stereotype of the mad scientist who 
presses forward with his desired experiments, the public and 
environment be damned. Indeed, both the Haida and SPICE 
experiments resonate with a vigorous online discourse that 
supposes the existence of an ongoing secret program of large-
scale climate modification.19 Moreover, the possible role of per-
sonal financial motivations in both experiments exacerbates 
the public distrust. These incidents only seem to confirm the 
fears of some that professional and financial gain, not scientific 
merit, are driving a rush to geoengineering experimentation.  
Lack of control is a second theme reflected in concerns sur-
rounding geoengineering field experiments. The controversy 
that the SPICE experiment provoked, notwithstanding the triv-
ial physical risk associated with the experiment itself, suggests 
that public worries extend beyond the hazards or scientific in-
tegrity of individual field experiments. These experiments pos-
sess an operational and symbolic significance that becomes ap-
parent when the experiments are considered in their historical 
and social contexts. One might sensibly wonder what these ex-
periments portend for further geoengineering research—or 
even deployment—and how they might alter humanity’s rela-
tionship to the environment.20  
 
tional laws); see also Fountain, supra note 14 (reporting commentator’s con-
clusion that the project had apparently contravened international agree-
ments); Parson & Keith, supra note 16 (asserting that the experiment “violat-
ed no international law”). 
 18. See Fountain, supra note 14; Andrew C. Revkin, A Fresh Look at Iron, 
Plankton, Carbon, Salmon, and Ocean Engineering, N.Y. TIMES: DOT EARTH 
(July 18, 2014), http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/07/18/a-fresh-look-at 
-iron-plankton-carbon-salmon-and-ocean-engineering. Preliminary accounts 
suggest positive effects on the salmon fishery. See id. 
 19. See Rose Cairns, Climates of Suspicion: “Chemtrail” Conspiracy Nar-
ratives and the International Politics of Geoengineering, 182 GEOGRAPHICAL J. 
70, 75–76 (2014) (discussing the chemtrail conspiracy narrative, consisting of 
the belief that trails left by airplanes are being deliberately sprayed for vari-
ous ends, including climate modification or population control). 
 20. See Lisa Dilling & Rachel Hauser, Governing Geoengineering Re-
search: Why, When and How?, 121 CLIMATIC CHANGE 553, 555 (2013), http:// 
sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/admin/publication_files/2013.21.pdf; Stefan Schäfer 
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In light of these developments, this Article finds a pressing 
need for greater governance of geoengineering research. Gov-
ernance refers broadly to the making and implementation of 
rules through laws, decisions, and other mechanisms.21 Existing 
proposals for geoengineering research governance concentrate 
on the physical risks associated with individual research pro-
jects. Generally overlooked, and more difficult to address, are 
the systemic concerns geoengineering research raises: techno-
logical lock-in—the danger that sustained research efforts will 
predetermine geoengineering deployment decisions; moral haz-
ard—the danger that increased attention to geoengineering will 
undermine efforts to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions; 
and the potential for geoengineering research to contribute to 
future global conflict. This Article tackles the difficult but es-
sential task of developing mechanisms to address these system-
ic concerns in addition to the physical risks of geoengineering 
research. 
Part I of this Article addresses preliminary issues, makes 
the case for governance of geoengineering research, and sur-
veys examples of research governance in other fields. Part II 
reviews existing proposals for geoengineering research govern-
ance and finds that they fail to address important, systemic 
concerns regarding technological lock-in, moral hazard, and po-
tential military conflict. Part III discusses the desired charac-
teristics of a prospective geoengineering research governance 
regime and offers specific recommendations. An ongoing pro-
grammatic technology assessment can analyze systemic con-
cerns and promote public deliberation on geoengineering re-
search and deployment. Policy makers can use the results of 
such an assessment to inform decisions and institute safe-
guards against the physical and systemic hazards of 
geoengineering research. 
 
et al., Correspondence: Field Tests of Solar Climate Engineering, 3 NATURE 
CLIMATE CHANGE 766, 766 (2013).  
 21. See RALPH BODLE ET AL., FED. ENVT’L AGENCY, GER., OPTIONS AND 
PROPOSALS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF GEOENGINEERING 13 
(Section I 1.3 Environmental Law & Friederike Domke eds., 2014) (defining 
governance to include “formal and informal, implicit and explicit processes, 
procedures and institutions”); Daniel Bodansky, The Who, What, and Where-
fore of Geoengineering Governance, 121 CLIMATIC CHANGE 539, 541–45 (2013) 
(discussing basic issues of governance); see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
supra note 2, at 10 (noting the wide variety of forms research governance may 
take). 
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I.  BACKGROUND   
A. PRELIMINARY ISSUES 
There are several preliminary issues that merit attention 
before delving into the case for and design of geoengineering 
research governance.  
First, what is geoengineering? Developing a working defi-
nition of geoengineering will help to establish a common base-
line for discussion and a predictable governance regime.22  
Although the term lacks an undisputed meaning, most ac-
counts include elements of scale and intent: geoengineering is 
large if not planetary in scale, and it is intended to counter ele-
vated GHG concentrations or their impacts.23 Proposals for 
geoengineering fall into two broad categories: carbon dioxide 
removal (CDR) and solar radiation management (SRM). CDR 
techniques strive to remove carbon dioxide (CO2) from the at-
mosphere and to store it elsewhere.24 Examples include ocean 
fertilization, direct capture, biochar, and enhanced weather-
ing.25 SRM techniques attempt to reduce the amount of radia-
tion absorbed by the Earth but do not reduce atmospheric GHG 
concentrations.26 Examples of SRM techniques include strato-
spheric aerosol release, cloud whitening, and space-based de-
flectors.27 Stratospheric aerosol release, which would deploy ti-
ny particles in the stratosphere to reflect sunlight into space, 
has been the subject of much attention because some perceive it 
as a relatively quick and inexpensive global response to climate 
 
 22. See BODLE ET AL., supra note 21, at 137. 
 23. See id. at 14, 43–46; David W. Keith, Box 1: Geoengineering, 409 NA-
TURE 420, 420 (2001); see also PHILLIP WILLIAMSON ET AL., GEOENGINEERING 
IN RELATION TO THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY: TECHNICAL AND 
REGULATORY MATTERS 23 (Technical Series No. 66, 2012), http://www 
.cbd.int/doc/publications/cbd-ts-66-en.pdf (summarizing selected definitions of 
geoengineering and defining the term as “a deliberate intervention in the 
planetary environment of a nature and scale intended to counteract anthropo-
genic climate change and its impacts”). 
 24. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 2, box S.1; Lin, supra 
note 1, at 716–19. 
 25. See Lin, supra note 1, at 716–17. For a more detailed description of 
each of these examples, see generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE IN-
TERVENTION: CARBON DIOXIDE REMOVAL AND RELIABLE SEQUESTRATION 
(2015). 
 26. See Lin, supra note 1, at 717–19; see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
supra note 2, at 2, box S.1 (referring to SRM as “albedo modification”). 
 27. See Lin, supra note 1, at 717–19. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 66–132 (describing in detail these and other SRM 
techniques). 
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change.28 Presently, no proposed geoengineering technique is 
ready for deployment at a scale that would substantially ad-
dress the impacts of climate change.29 
The techniques falling under the rubric of geoengineering 
differ significantly in their methodologies, levels of risk, and 
feasibility.30 Of course, any characterization of specific tech-
niques at this time is preliminary and rests on untested as-
sumptions. Several general observations nevertheless seem 
reasonable. Some techniques could be implemented incremen-
tally at a modest scale and within national boundaries, where-
as others would require global implementation. Relatedly, some 
techniques—such as ocean fertilization and stratospheric aero-
sol release—would pose greater transboundary risks than oth-
ers.31 Because they are aimed directly at atmospheric GHGs, 
CDR techniques would generally be slower acting, and aside 
from the technique of ocean fertilization, potentially less 
risky.32 SRM techniques, in contrast, would involve greater 
risks and uncertainties because they would only alleviate some 
of climate change’s symptoms rather than address its root 
causes.33 Proposed geoengineering techniques also differ in 
their apparent feasibility, as each technique faces various eco-
nomic, technical, and political challenges. The inclusion of all 
geoengineering techniques within a system of research govern-
ance would promote coordination, priority setting, and public 
trust. At the same time, design of oversight should take into ac-
count relevant differences between techniques. SRM techniques 
warrant particular scrutiny not only because of their greater 
potential risks, but also because of the systemic concerns they 
tend to raise. 
 
 28. See, e.g., ROYAL SOC’Y, GEOENGINEERING THE CLIMATE: SCIENCE, 
GOVERNANCE, AND UNCERTAINTY 31 tbl.3.4 (2009) (preliminarily evaluating 
stratospheric aerosols as high in terms of effectiveness, affordability, and 
timeliness, but low in terms of safety); Parson & Keith, supra note 16 (com-
menting that “attention and controversy have centered on methods to reduce 
incoming sunlight,” including stratospheric aerosol release). 
 29. See ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 28, at 57 (concluding that various 
geoengineering methods “are unlikely to be ready for deployment in the short 
to medium term”). 
 30. BODLE ET AL., supra note 21, at 40. 
 31. See id. at 20. 
 32. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 2–4; Edward A. Par-
son & Lia N. Ernst, International Governance of Climate Engineering, 14 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 307, 313, 316 (2013). 
 33. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 3, 5–7; Lin, supra note 
1, at 715, 718. 
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A second question regards whether governance should fo-
cus on geoengineering research, deployment, or both. The con-
troversy generated by the Haida and SPICE experiments sug-
gests a growing urgency in the need for governance of field 
experimentation. In contrast to the case for governance of re-
search, which is discussed more thoroughly below, the case for 
governance of deployment is less pressing, with any deploy-
ment likely to be decades or more away.34 Whether adequate 
governance of research is possible without also governing de-
ployment presents a difficult question. A governance structure 
established for research may establish a precedent for later 
governance of deployment.35 Moreover, to the extent that 
geoengineering research efforts have the ultimate aim of de-
ployment, research governance arguably would serve as an in-
direct form of deployment governance. Any attempt to separate 
governance functions may be further complicated by the diffi-
culty of distinguishing large-scale field experiments from full-
scale deployment.36 For stratospheric aerosol release, for exam-
ple, the most informative way to test efficacy and risks—and 
perhaps the only reliable way to do so—may involve full-scale 
and extended deployment.37  
Notwithstanding these points, focusing on research gov-
ernance is appropriate. Attempting to establish governance of 
both deployment and research could prove to be a distraction. If 
governance of both deployment and research are grouped to-
gether, policy makers and stakeholders might perceive 
geoengineering governance to be less urgent generally and thus 
less worthy of action. Although geoengineering deployment 
raises important and challenging governance issues, many of 
these issues are distinct from those posed by field research.38 
 
 34. See Parson & Ernst, supra note 32, at 331 (distinguishing long-term 
tasks of regulatory and security governance from “near-term tasks of research, 
technology development, and risk assessment[, which] may remain the princi-
pal governance needs for a decade or more”); cf. DAVID KEITH, A CASE FOR 
CLIMATE ENGINEERING 87–88 (2013) (projecting deployment of stratospheric 
aerosols no earlier than 2025 or “more realistically, 2035 with missteps and 
surprises”). 
 35. See BODLE ET AL., supra note 21, at 21; cf. Parson & Ernst, supra note 
32, at 329 (“[T]here will not be a clean boundary between an early period of 
‘scientific’ [geoengineering] governance and some later period of ‘operational’ 
governance.”). 
 36. See Alan Robock et al., A Test for Geoengineering?, 327 SCIENCE 530, 
530–31 (2010). 
 37. See id. 
 38. See infra text accompanying notes 347–49. 
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Resolving these issues at this time is unlikely, and seeking to 
do so would unnecessarily complicate governance efforts.39 
A governance effort focused on research would need to set-
tle on an approach for determining which research projects re-
quire oversight. An effects-based approach would regulate re-
search projects whose environmental impacts potentially 
exceed a certain threshold.40 Research projects below the 
threshold would not receive particular geoengineering-related 
scrutiny, though they would have to comply with any otherwise 
applicable laws. However, an approach centered on individual 
projects would tend to overlook cumulative effects and the ways 
in which seemingly insignificant projects could contribute to 
the overall development of a geoengineering technique. A pur-
pose-based approach would regulate all research activities that 
have a geoengineering purpose. A project’s purpose could be de-
fined subjectively or objectively. A subjective definition of pur-
pose—based on a researcher’s declared objective or justification 
for a project—would rely on the good faith of researchers to 
identify geoengineering experiments.41 Such an approach, 
which would create an incentive to conceal the actual purpose 
of a geoengineering experiment, may fail to earn the public 
trust.42 An objective definition of purpose—based on an inde-
pendent determination of whether research might reasonably 
advance a geoengineering technique—may more readily garner 
public confidence. At the same time, it would be more difficult 
to administer, potentially necessitating the burdensome and 
politically fraught screening of numerous climate-related re-
search projects.43 Ultimately, these difficulties, along with the 
desirability of accounting for cumulative and systemic con-
cerns, argue for an approach that combines a subjective defini-
tion of purpose with a list of objectively defined specific activi-
 
 39. See Parson & Ernst, supra note 32, at 331 (suggesting that it “may . . . 
be possible to defer most high-stakes and potentially divisive questions of reg-
ulatory and security governance”). 
 40. See Parson & Keith, supra note 16, at 1279. 
 41. Cf. Dilling & Hauser, supra note 20, at 562 (proposing that research 
“justified by investigators or programs as informing the idea of intentionally 
manipulating the earth’s climate . . . be classified as geoengineering re-
search”). 
 42. See Parson & Keith, supra note 16. 
 43. See Bronislaw Szerszynski et al., Why Solar Radiation Management 
Geoengineering and Democracy Won’t Mix, 45 ENV’T & PLANNING A 2809, 2813 
(2013). 
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ties.44 Under this approach, research activities would be subject 
to governance if they either incorporate a geoengineering pur-
pose as a declared objective or fall within designated categories 
of geoengineering research activities. 
B. THE CASE FOR RESEARCH GOVERNANCE 
But is governance of geoengineering research even neces-
sary? Scientists generally enjoy freedom of research, subject to 
informed consent and other ethical limits on human and ani-
mal experimentation.45 This freedom, which is recognized or 
supported in various laws and treaties,46 encompasses the au-
tonomy to decide on research projects and approaches without 
political interference.47 Underlying the principle is the pre-
sumption that research generates knowledge, and knowledge is 
socially desirable, both as an inherent matter and because it 
enables informed democratic choices.48 In the United States, 
freedom of research is reflected in the “social contract for sci-
ence”: in exchange for public funding, scientists provide 
 
 44. Cf. BODLE ET AL., supra note 21, at 136 (suggesting a geoengineering 
definition be sufficiently broad to cover a wide range of methods and also in-
clude a list that expressly mentions specific techniques). 
 45. See Gary E. Marchant & Lynda L. Pope, The Problems with Forbid-
ding Science, 15 SCI. & ENGINEERING ETHICS 375, 377 (2009) (“There is a 
strong presumption in modern industrialized democracies, endorsed by most 
scientists, in favor of minimal government interference in the content of basic 
scientific research.”); Peter Singer, Ethics and the Limits of Scientific Free-
dom, 79 MONIST 218, 218–20 (1996). While some assert that scientists have a 
right to research, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized no such right, and 
any such right arguably rests on the extent to which a research inquiry sup-
ports democratic governance. See Mark B. Brown & David H. Guston, Science, 
Democracy, and the Right To Research, 15 SCI. & ENGINEERING ETHICS 351, 
362 (2009). 
 46. See BODLE ET AL., supra note 21, at 140; Jesse Reynolds, Climate En-
gineering Field Research: The Favorable Setting of International Environmen-
tal Law, 5 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE & ENV’T 417, 430–31 (2014) (not-
ing various multilateral environmental treaties that encourage scientific 
research); see also Ralph Cicerone, Geoengineering: Encouraging Research and 
Overseeing Implementation, 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 221, 224 (2006) (“Freedom 
of inquiry itself has moral value.”). Indeed, detailed formal international regu-
lation of any area of research is unprecedented. See SOLAR RADIATION MGMT. 
GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, SOLAR RADIATION MANAGEMENT: THE GOVERNANCE 
OF RESEARCH 33 (2011). 
 47. See Torsten Wilholt, Scientific Freedom: Its Grounds and Their Limi-
tations, 41 STUD. HIST. & PHIL. SCI. 174, 174–75 (2010); Scientific Freedom 
and the Public Good, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (2008), http://www 
.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/scientific_integrity/ 
scientific_freedom.pdf. 
 48. See Wilholt, supra note 47, at 175–78. 
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knowledge to society while themselves determining the aims of 
research as well as its governing standards.49 Although the so-
cial contract for science has come under attack in recent years, 
it continues to dominate popular conceptions of scientists’ 
role.50  
Against the tradition of scientific freedom, calls for govern-
ance of geoengineering research require justification. The case 
for such governance is rooted in the frustration of what some 
scientists perceive as increasingly urgent field research. 
Geoengineering research is growing rapidly, and interest in 
conducting field experiments is on the rise.51 Most research to 
date has been confined to computer modeling or indoor re-
search, prompting various expert bodies, scientists, and com-
mentators to contend that field research is necessary.52 A re-
search agenda could address the feasibility of specific 
techniques, their interaction with changing climate conditions, 
the geographic distribution of effects, the controllability and ef-
 
 49. See Sheila Jasanoff, Technologies of Humility: Citizen Participation in 
Governing Science, 41 MINERVA 223, 227–28 (2003). 
 50. See id. at 228–29. 
 51. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 155–56 (recommend-
ing small-scale field studies to investigate potential viability of albedo modifi-
cation techniques); see also CLIVE HAMILTON, EARTHMASTERS: THE DAWN OF 
THE AGE OF CLIMATE ENGINEERING 17 (2013) (noting growth of the 
geoengineering research network); M. Granger Morgan et al., Needed: Re-
search Guidelines for Solar Radiation Management, 29 ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 
37, 41 (2013) (discussing “calls for a significantly expanded research program 
on SRM”); Parson & Ernst, supra note 32, at 309 (noting the “sharp increase 
in attention to climate engineering (CE) technologies”); Rob Bellamy, Safety 
First! Framing and Governing Climate Geoengineering Experimentation 14 
(Climate Geoegineering Governance Working Paper Series, No. 014, 2014) 
http://www.geoengineering-governance-research.org/perch/resources/ 
workingpaper14bellamysafetyfirst.pdf (identifying the “need to know more” as 
a prevalent theme in geoengineering discourse).  
 52. See, e.g., GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 11-71, TECHNOLOGY 
ASSESSMENT: CLIMATE ENGINEERING: TECHNICAL STATUS, FUTURE DIREC-
TIONS, AND POTENTIAL RESPONSES 49 (2011) (reporting that the majority of 
experts consulted in the study “advocated starting significant climate engi-
neering research now or in the very near future”); BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., 
TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE REMEDIATION RESEARCH, GEOENGINEERING: A NA-
TIONAL STRATEGIC PLAN FOR RESEARCH ON THE POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS, 
FEASIBILITY, AND CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE REMEDIATION TECHNOLOGIES 
20 (2011) [hereinafter BPC] (“Time is of the essence in establishing a thought-
ful research program. . . .”); ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 28, at 61 (“Research is 
urgently needed for evaluating which methods are feasible, and to identify po-
tential risks.”); Parson & Ernst, supra note 32, at 322 (asserting that a con-
sensus exists that research into the feasibility, effects, and potential risks of 
CE technologies “should begin immediately”). 
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fects of regional interventions, and the identification and at-
tribution of harmful effects.53 SRM field research, for example, 
could take the form of small-scale experiments to increase un-
derstanding of physical, chemical, and radiative properties in 
the atmosphere; atmospheric studies across a range of scales to 
determine the applicability of models at different scales; global-
scale experiments to measure risks and climate response; and 
tests of technologies for deploying SRM.54 
A commonly proffered rationale for geoengineering re-
search is for society to be well-informed of the effectiveness and 
risks of various techniques “if and when geoengineering be-
comes necessary.”55 Current geoengineering proposals are 
sometimes described as “speculative,”56 and years or decades of 
research would likely be needed before deployment of any tech-
nique.57 In the absence of sufficient research, some commenta-
tors warn, society could find itself in a “policy train wreck” in 
which “only unrefined, untested, and excessively risky ap-
proaches will be available” should a climate emergency occur.58 
Even some who are more skeptical of the need for 
geoengineering believe that research can inform discussions 
and decisions regarding its potential use.59 Research might be 
 
 53. See BPC, supra note 52, at 24–26; Parson & Ernst, supra note 32, at 
328. 
 54. See David W. Keith et al., Field Experiments on Solar Geoengineering: 
Report of a Workshop Exploring a Representative Research Portfolio, PHIL. 
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A, Nov. 17, 2014, at 1, 2–4. 
 55. Bodansky, supra note 21, at 546; see also BPC, supra note 52, at 14; 
Parson & Keith, supra note 16. 
 56. Steve Rayner et al., The Oxford Principles, 121 CLIMATIC CHANGE 
499, 501 (2013) (noting the need for “extensive research” into the “technical, 
environmental, socio-political, ethical and economic characteristics” of all 
geoengineering technologies). 
 57. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 52; Parson & Ernst, 
supra note 32, at 322 (noting present ignorance regarding “how well specific 
interventions and delivery methods would work”). 
 58. Parson & Keith, supra note 16, at 1279. The use of “emergency” rheto-
ric in connection with geoengineering, let alone the determination of what 
might constitute a climate emergency, poses serious difficulties. See Nils 
Markusson et al., “In Case of Emergency Press Here”: Framing Geoengineering 
as a Response to Dangerous Climate Change, 5 WIRES CLIMATE CHANGE 281, 
284, 288 (2014).  
 59. See BPC, supra note 52, at 3; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, 
at 8–9; ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 28, at 49, 52; Alan Robock, Stratospheric Aer-
osol Geoengineering, in GEOENGINEERING OF THE CLIMATE SYSTEM 162, 181 
(R.E. Hester et al. eds., 2014); David G. Victor et al., The Geoengineering Op-
tion: A Last Resort Against Global Warming?, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 2009, 
at 64, 74 (contending that research “would transform the discussion about 
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valuable even if nations or the international community ulti-
mately reject geoengineering, as it can facilitate the detection 
and countering of unauthorized geoengineering efforts.60 
Notwithstanding scientists’ increasing interest in 
geoengineering research, overall funding for research remains 
modest and funding for field experimentation is especially lim-
ited.61 Exact funding data is difficult to gather in the absence of 
a clear operational definition of geoengineering,62 but estimates 
generally characterize research amounts as “very low.”63 The 
most prominent national funding effort, the SPICE project, 
consists of £1.6 million in total research support spread out 
over several years.64 The United States lacks a dedicated re-
search program, with existing geoengineering research efforts 
occurring largely as part of broader climate and atmospheric 
science programs.65 Private individuals, including Bill Gates, 
provide a significant share of research support.66 Yet even this 
support is relatively modest in terms of the scale of research it 
enables.67 Gates, for example, has contributed $4.6 million to a 
fund administered by two leading geoengineering researchers.68 
 
geoengineering from an abstract debate into one focused on real risk assess-
ment”). 
 60. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 10; Mark G. Law-
rence, The Geoengineering Dilemma: To Speak or Not To Speak, 77 CLIMATIC 
CHANGE 245, 246 (2006). 
 61. A 2010 GAO report estimated total U.S. government spending on di-
rect geoengineering research at less than $2 million. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-10-903, CLIMATE CHANGE: A COORDINATED STRATEGY COULD 
FOCUS FEDERAL GEOENGINEERING RESEARCH AND INFORM GOVERNANCE EF-
FORTS 19 (2010) [hereinafter GAO-10-903]. A 2013 estimate of the total 
amount worldwide being spent on ongoing SRM research projects was $20–25 
million. Geoengineering Research, GIVEWELL, http://www.givewell.org/labs/ 
causes/geoengineering#footnoteref21_nhq5rn9 (last visited Apr. 16, 2016). 
 62. See GAO-10-903, supra note 61, at 23.  
 63. See, e.g., Bodansky, supra note 21, at 546. 
 64. See Daniel Cressey, Cancelled Project Spurs Debate over 
Geoengineering Patents, 485 NATURE 429 (2012). 
 65. See GAO-10-903, supra note 61, at 23; Morgan et al., supra note 51.  
 66. See HAMILTON, supra note 51, at 77 (characterizing Gates as “the 
world’s leading financial supporter of geoengineering research” and discussing 
Richard Branson’s offer of a $25 million prize for developing a plan to extract 
carbon from the atmosphere); Bodansky, supra note 21, at 546; John Vidal, 
Bill Gates Backs Climate Scientists Lobbying for Large-Scale Geoengineering, 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 6, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/feb/06/ 
bill-gates-climate-scientists-geoengineering. 
 67. See Alan Robock, Is Geoengineering Research Ethical?, 4 SICHERHEIT 
& FRIEDEN 226, 228 (“[A] larger fraction of current geoengineering research 
funding comes from the US$1,000,000 per year that Bill Gates gives to David 
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Potential funders have shied away particularly from field 
research because of its controversial nature. As the Haida and 
SPICE incidents suggest, concerns extend beyond any immedi-
ate physical risks that experiments might pose. The case for 
oversight rests equally on the goal-directed nature of 
geoengineering research and on the contested nature of that 
goal. The primary aim of such research is not to generate pure 
scientific knowledge nor to develop innovations that could be 
applied in the market, but rather to create specific deployable 
mechanisms for deliberately altering the climate.69 
Geoengineering research warrants external governance and 
public engagement because the research itself carries signifi-
cant and controversial policy implications and can alter the pol-
icy environment in which decisions are made.70 In the absence 
of legitimate and effective governance, additional field research 
will lead to further controversy,71 which in turn could stymie 
transparent and accountable research efforts while spawning a 
rise in furtive experimentation.  
At present, there is no general system of oversight for 
geoengineering field experimentation. Nor do mechanisms exist 
to ensure attention to concerns regarding the broader implica-
tions of research. As one analysis concludes, “almost none of 
[international environmental law] was developed with climate 
engineering in mind.”72 Indeed, that analysis suggests that in-
ternational law “favor[s]” geoengineering research because it 
could develop methods for reducing climate risk to humans and 
the environment.73 While the reduction of climate risks indeed 
would be consistent with several environmental agreements,74 
international environmental law provides no definitive guid-
ance in this regard. For example, the precautionary principle, 
 
Keith and Ken Caldeira.”); see also Vidal, supra note 66 (reporting that Gates 
has funded $4.6 million worth of geoengineering research). 
 68. The researchers, David Keith and Ken Caldeira, “select projects that 
receive support from the fund.” See FUND FOR INNOVATIVE CLIMATE & ENERGY 
RESEARCH, http://dge.stanford.edu/labs/caldeiralab/FICER.html (last visited 
Apr. 16, 2016). 
 69. See Dilling & Hauser, supra note 20 (“This intentionality of the re-
search program places geoengineering clearly in the sphere of science for poli-
cy, or usable science.”). 
 70. See id. 
 71. See Rayner et al., supra note 56 (“[C]ontroversies will only increase 
over time if research is allowed to continue.”). 
 72. Reynolds, supra note 46, at 480. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See id. at 480–81. 
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which some characterize as an emerging customary principle of 
international environmental law,75 could be interpreted as ei-
ther encouraging or discouraging geoengineering research.76 
Likewise, the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate 
Change’s objective of avoiding “dangerous anthropogenic inter-
ference” with the climate system77 leaves open the question of 
whether geoengineering itself might constitute dangerous an-
thropogenic interference.  
To date, two international treaty regimes have specifically 
addressed the issue of geoengineering research. The parties to 
the London Convention and London Protocol (LC/LP) have de-
veloped an incipient oversight system for field research on 
ocean fertilization and other marine-based geoengineering 
techniques. As a general matter, the LC/LP prohibit the delib-
erate disposal of waste at sea, but allow placement of matter 
for purposes other than disposal.78 In 2008, the parties to these 
agreements adopted a resolution opposing “ocean fertilization 
activities other than legitimate scientific research.”79 A 2010 
resolution encourages member-states to review proposed ocean 
fertilization activity under an assessment framework to deter-
mine whether it constitutes legitimate scientific research and 
to assess its environmental impacts.80 The assessment frame-
work also recommends a process to notify potentially affected 
countries, explain potential impacts, encourage scientific coop-
 
 75. A leading articulation of the precautionary principle declares that 
“[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scien-
tific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation.” U.N. Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992). 
 76. See Lin, supra note 1. 
 77. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 2, 
May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 164. 
 78. 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution 
by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, arts. 1.4.1, 1.4.2.2, 4, Nov. 7, 1996, 
36 I.L.M. 1; see Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping 
of Wastes and Other Matter, art. III.1(a), Dec. 29, 1972, 1046 U.N.T.S. 140 (re-
ferring to “deliberate disposal at sea,” as opposed to “deliberate disposal into 
the sea”). 
 79. London Convention and Protocol, Resolution LC-LP.1 (2008) on the 
Regulation of Ocean Fertilization, LC 30/16 (Oct. 31, 2008). 
 80. London Convention and Protocol, Resolution LC-LP.2 (2010) on the 
Assessment Framework for Scientific Research Involving Ocean Fertilization 
(Oct. 14, 2010).  
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eration, and provide for ongoing consultation.81 Building on the 
2008 and 2010 resolutions, the parties to the London Protocol 
later adopted an amendment to the protocol. If ratified, the 
amendment would make the assessment and permitting pro-
cess binding and expand its application to other marine 
geoengineering activities.82 Permits would issue only if a pro-
posed activity is not contrary to the aims of the London Protocol 
and an environmental assessment determines that pollution 
and detriment would be prevented or minimized.83 
Field experiments outside the marine environment lie be-
yond the scope of the LC/LP. Of particular concern are SRM 
techniques, which could involve experimentation and deploy-
ment on a global scale.84 The most frequently discussed SRM 
techniques, stratospheric aerosol release and cloud brightening, 
would involve field trials in the atmosphere, where there is no 
existing treaty regime possessing obvious oversight responsibil-
ity.85 The parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD), a treaty that promotes biodiversity primarily through 
national laws and policies,86 have attempted to fill this void. 
Specifically, the CBD parties adopted a decision discouraging 
geoengineering activities potentially affecting biodiversity, with 
the exception of “small scale scientific research studies . . . in a 
controlled setting.”87 Such research, the decision cautions, 
should occur only if subject to a prior environmental assess-
ment and justified by the need to gather specific scientific da-
ta.88 Notably, the decision is nonbinding and has no force in the 
 
 81. The Assessment Framework can be found at Report of the Thirty-Fifth 
Consultative Meeting and the Eighth Meeting of Contracting Parties to the 
London Convention, LC 35/15, annex 6 (2013). 
 82. Resolution LP.4(8) on the Amendment to the London Protocol to Regu-
late the Placement of Matter for Ocean Fertilization and Other Marine 
Geoengineering Activities, LC 35/15, annex 4, at 8–9 (Oct. 18, 2013) [hereinaf-
ter Resolution LP.4(8)]. 
 83. Id. at 8. 
 84. See SOLAR RADIATION MGMT. GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, supra note 46, 
at 14–16. 
 85. See Lin, supra note 1, at 730–31 (discussing international legal re-
gimes governing air pollution). 
 86. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 143 
[hereinafter CBD], http://www.cbd.int/convention/convention.shtml.  
 87. Decision Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention 
on Biological Diversity, X/33: Biodiversity and Climate Change, ¶ 8(w), Oct. 
29, 2010, UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/33 [hereinafter Decision by the Parties to 
the CBD]. 
 88. Id. 
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United States, which is not a party to the CBD.89 Moreover, the 
decision does not define critical terms such as “small scale sci-
entific research studies” and “controlled setting,” and in con-
trast to the LC/LP’s assessment framework, provides little 
guidance to member-states regarding implementation.90 
To sum up, support for and concern about geoengineering 
research are both on the rise. On the one hand, the worsening 
climate situation and dim prospects for meaningful GHG miti-
gation efforts make increasingly important the exploration of a 
variety of responses to climate change. Geoengineering re-
search can generate valuable information for deciding whether 
geoengineering options might be viable and how they might be 
used.91 On the other hand, the field experimentation that would 
be necessary to evaluate geoengineering options or to deploy 
them has largely been stymied. Geoengineering research is in a 
state of “deadlock” where even publicly sponsored and seeming-
ly harmless field experiments are unable to proceed.92  
Should this deadlock remain unresolved, one can expect 
further controversy, a continued reluctance to fund even public-
ly accountable tests, and a rise in furtive experimentation. As 
climate change’s effects become more pronounced, the pressure 
to explore and ultimately deploy geoengineering will only in-
tensify.93 At the same time, increased attention to 
 
 89. The CBD does not authorize its Conference of the Parties to adopt le-
gally binding decisions. Accordingly, one commentator characterizes CBD de-
cisions as “‘soft law’ of a primarily political nature.” ALEXANDER PROELSS, LE-
GAL OPINION ON THE LEGALITY OF THE LOHAFEX MARINE RESEARCH 
EXPERIMENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (2009), http://www.internat-recht 
.uni-kiel.de/de/forschung/opinions/LOHAFEX_en.pdf. For a list of parties that 
have ratified the CBD, see List of Parties, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DI-
VERSITY, http://www.cbd.int/convention/parties/list (last visited Apr. 16, 2016). 
 90. For further discussion of the shortcomings of the CBD decisions, see 
BODLE ET AL., supra note 21, at 59, 152–53. 
 91. See BPC, supra note 52, at 29; Bodansky, supra note 21, at 546. 
 92. Parson and Keith use the term “deadlock” to characterize the current 
governance of geoengineering research: namely, the increasingly polarized de-
bate regarding such questions as whether government regulation is needed 
and whether large-scale research requires greater oversight. Parson & Keith, 
supra note 16. But cf. Schäfer et al., supra note 20 (contending that “there is 
no deadlock on climate engineering governance”). In my view, the term dead-
lock better characterizes the present state of geoengineering field experimen-
tation.  
 93. See Bodansky, supra note 21, at 540 (observing that “grim outlook” 
regarding rising global GHG emissions “has led many to take a second look at 
geoengineering”); see also INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 1065 
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geoengineering is unlikely to dissipate public discomfort and 
uncertainties associated with many geoengineering proposals.94 
In such circumstances, states will remain hesitant to openly 
undertake or sponsor field experiments. Polarized views on the 
subject may make it difficult for states to adopt any policy on 
geoengineering whatsoever.95 And without a clear system of 
governance, projects lacking external oversight and peer review 
may become more common. The establishment of a credible re-
search governance structure could break the deadlock by 
providing assurance that geoengineers are not performing un-
controlled experiments or embarking on a course leading to 
full-scale deployment without official sanction. 
C. MODELS FOR RESEARCH GOVERNANCE 
International law provides little guidance for establishing 
a system of research oversight. International environmental 
law generally favors scientific research, and precedents for gov-
erning field experimentation, particularly in its early stages, 
are limited.96 For instance, the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, which contains relatively detailed provisions on re-
search, affirms the right of states and “competent international 
organizations” “to conduct marine scientific research subject to 
the rights and duties of other States” and encourages the exer-
cise of this right.97 The right to conduct research is subject to 
procedural and substantive obligations designed to protect oth-
er states from transboundary harm.98 Beyond such obligations, 
 
(2014) (discussing geoengineering and noting the “increasing attention” it has 
received in the scientific literature). 
 94. See Nick Pidgeon et al., Exploring Early Public Responses to 
Geoengineering, 370 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 4176, 4177 (2012); 
cf. Adam Corner et al., “Experiment Earth?” Reflections on a Public  
Dialogue on Geoengineering 18 (unpublished manuscript), http://psych.cf.ac 
.uk/understandingrisk/docs/experiment_earth.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2016) 
(reporting a weak positive correlation between knowledge about CDR and 
support for CDR and a negative correlation between knowledge about SRM 
and support for SRM). 
 95. See BODLE ET AL., supra note 21, at 131. 
 96. See Reynolds, supra note 46. 
 97. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, arts. 238, 239, Dec. 
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS], http://www.un.org/Depts/ 
los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm. The Convention on the 
Law of the Sea is one of the few treaties potentially relevant to geoengineering 
that contains detailed provisions governing research. See Reynolds, supra note 
46, at 431. 
 98. See, e.g., UNCLOS, supra note 97, art. 242(1) (describing obligation of 
state conducting research to provide other states an opportunity to obtain in-
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though, the convention contains no provisions for comprehen-
sive oversight of research.  
Experience under another environmental treaty, the Inter-
national Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, warns 
against excessive deference to treaty members in the oversight 
of scientific research. This convention’s governing body estab-
lished an indefinite moratorium on commercial whaling in 
1982.99 However, parties to the convention may issue permits 
authorizing the killing of whales for purposes of scientific re-
search “subject to such restrictions as to number and . . . such 
other conditions as [each party] thinks fit.”100 Contending that 
the killing of hundreds of whales per year is necessary for re-
search purposes, Japan has made liberal use of these permits 
to circumvent the moratorium.101 Japan vows to continue its 
whaling program even in the face of strong international con-
demnation and an International Court of Justice finding that it 
lacks scientific merit.102 The ongoing conflict illustrates not only 
the difficulty of defining and policing research, but also the in-
ability to avoid value-laden policy determinations by deferring 
to scientific expertise.103 
Perhaps the most instructive precedent for geoengineering 
research governance comes from the field of recombinant DNA 
(rDNA) research. In the early 1970s, rDNA researchers faced a 
research deadlock resembling that confronting geoengineering 
researchers today. Scientists, policy makers, and the public 
worried that rDNA experiments might wreak havoc if they ac-
cidentally released genetically altered organisms into the envi-
 
formation necessary to prevent and control damage to human health and ma-
rine environment); id. at art. 246 (describing right of coastal states to regulate 
research in their exclusive economic zone and continental shelf); Reynolds, su-
pra note 46, at 475–78 (discussing customary law obligations to prevent or 
control transboundary harm and to cooperate in doing so). 
 99. See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
POLICY 1050–54 (4th ed. 2011) (noting that the moratorium took effect in 
1986). 
 100. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 
art. VIII, 161 U.N.T.S. 72.  
 101. See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 99, at 1058–59. 
 102. See Editorial, Japan Is Back in the Hunt for Whales, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
29, 2014, at SR8; see also HUNTER ET AL., supra note 99, at 1059 (“[E]very 
IWC meeting adopts a resolution condemning [Japan’s] practice.”). 
 103. See Daniel Bodansky, Legitimacy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF IN-
TERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 704, 720 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 
2007). 
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ronment.104 Such concerns led researchers to impose a volun-
tary moratorium on further research.105 The purpose of the 
moratorium was to preserve the status quo while the scientific 
community undertook a more considered evaluation of the new 
technology and its risks.106 That evaluation took place at the 
1975 Asilomar Conference, where an international gathering of 
scientists developed recommendations designed to address the 
potential hazards of rDNA experiments.107 Deeming societal 
concerns to be adequately addressed, the scientists ended the 
research moratorium. The Asilomar recommendations subse-
quently proved influential, serving as the foundation for gov-
ernment guidelines on publicly funded rDNA research.108  
Although the Asilomar recommendations enabled rDNA 
research to proceed, the effort offers a flawed model for govern-
ing research in an emerging technology. The Asilomar confer-
ence involved a limited range of participants, predominantly 
scientists who favored moving forward with research.109 Moreo-
ver, the scope of discussions was narrow, focusing on technical 
issues of risk management.110 Discussions largely omitted 
broader societal concerns as well as ethical and legal issues be-
cause their consideration was seen as “premature” and “specu-
lative.”111 Asilomar was viewed as a success at the time, but its 
failure to incorporate the public and its concerns at an early 
stage of technology development contributed to a resistance to 
biotechnology that continues today.112 Geoengineering research-
ers interested in proceeding with field experiments would do 
 
 104. See Paul Berg et al., Potential Biohazards of Recombinant DNA Mole-
cules, 185 SCIENCE 303, 303 (1974) (“There is serious concern that some of 
these artificial recombinant DNA molecules could prove biologically hazard-
ous.”). 
 105. See id. 
 106. See Paul Berg & Maxine F. Singer, The Recombinant DNA Controver-
sy: Twenty Years Later, 92 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 9011, 9011 (1995). 
 107. See ALBERT C. LIN, PROMETHEUS REIMAGINED: TECHNOLOGY, ENVI-
RONMENT, AND LAW IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 52–53 (2013). 
 108. See id. at 54. 
 109. See Paul Berg, Meetings That Changed the World: Asilomar 1975, NA-
TURE (Sept. 18, 2008), http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v455/n7211/ 
full/455290a.html (“[M]ost researchers, like me, acknowledged that the new 
technology opened extraordinary avenues for genetics and could ultimately 
lead to extraordinary opportunities in medicine, agriculture, and industry.”). 
 110. See LIN, supra note 107, at 53. 
 111. Berg & Singer, supra note 106, at 9012. 
 112. See LIN, supra note 107, at 72, 78. 
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well to be more inclusive and more sensitive to non-technical 
concerns. 
Another illustration of self-guided oversight comes from 
the governance of genetics research and research involving 
human subjects. Such research is often subject to domestic laws 
and restrictions, but at the international level, soft law devel-
oped by expert bodies predominates.113 The leading code of ethi-
cal principles for medical research involving human subjects is 
the Declaration of Helsinki.114 Developed by the World Medical 
Association and aimed at securing respect for individuals and 
their right to make informed decisions,115 the Declaration en-
courages physicians to conduct research under the oversight of 
independent research committees and with the informed con-
sent of research subjects.116 The Declaration provides an exam-
ple of voluntary, self-governing oversight analogous to the 
measures that rDNA researchers adopted at Asilomar and is 
subject to similar limitations and critiques.  
Geoengineering research governance might also draw les-
sons from beyond international environmental law. Perhaps 
the most obvious examples of international restrictions on re-
search involve biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Each 
of these dual use technologies relies on skills, information, and 
equipment that may be used for both peaceful and military 
purposes, complicating efforts to restrict weapons research.117 
Determining the actual or primary purpose of research is rarely 
straightforward, and perhaps futile when a technology can be 
readily converted from peaceful to military use.  
The experience of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention 
(BWC) illustrates some of the difficulties of regulating research 
for dual use technologies. The BWC forbids parties from devel-
oping, producing, stockpiling, or acquiring biological weap-
 
 113. Reynolds, supra note 46. 
 114. WORLD MED. ASS’N, DECLARATION OF HELSINKI—ETHICAL PRINCI-
PLES FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS (2013), http:// 
www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3 [hereinafter DECLARATION OF 
HELSINKI]; see Soren Holm, Declaration of Helsinki, in INTERNATIONAL ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 1232 (Hugh La Follette ed., 2013) (describing the Decla-
ration as “an important normative document in international discussions 
about research ethics,” despite the fact that the World Medical Association is 
only an umbrella organization for medical associations across the world). 
 115. DECLARATION OF HELSINKI, supra note 114, at arts. 7–9, 25–32. 
 116. Id. at arts. 2, 23; see Holm, supra note 114. 
 117. See David P. Fidler, International Law and Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion: End of the Arms Control Approach?, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 39, 66 
(2004). 
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ons.118 However, the treaty allows research for defensive pur-
poses even though it “can involve pathogens and technologies 
that may be little different from the work needed to develop of-
fensive weapons.”119 The treaty lacks a verification system, 
moreover. Parties were unable to agree on a mechanism for dis-
tinguishing between prohibited research aimed at developing 
offensive weapons and other, permissible biological research.120 
In the absence of a verification mechanism, Iraq and the former 
Soviet Union have committed substantial violations of the trea-
ty’s provisions, calling into question the treaty’s effectiveness.121  
The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) similarly 
forbids parties from developing, producing, stockpiling, or ac-
quiring chemical weapons.122 In contrast to the BWC, the CWC 
incorporates a detailed verification system that includes 
recordkeeping and inspection requirements.123 While this verifi-
cation system promises to make the CWC more effective than 
the BWC, the potential for dual use remains. For instance, 
those chemicals most susceptible to weapons use are generally 
prohibited, but parties may still produce and use such chemi-
cals for research purposes.124 In addition, technological advanc-
es in neuroscience and nanotechnology that offer potential ben-
 
 118. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their 
Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, art. I, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163 (emphasis 
added). 
 119. Leonard S. Spector, Slowing Proliferation: Why Legal Tools Matter, 34 
VT. L. REV. 619, 621 (2010).  
 120. See id. at 620–21. In rejecting a draft protocol that would have estab-
lished a verification regime, the United States explained that detecting viola-
tions would be nearly impossible because of the potential dual use of biological 
weapon components. John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and 
International Security, Remarks at the Tokyo America Center: The U.S. Posi-
tion on the Biological Weapons Convention: Combating the BW Threat (Aug. 
26, 2002), http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/us/rm/13090.htm.  
 121. See Fidler, supra note 117, at 63–64. 
 122. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stock-
piling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 
art. I.1, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-219, 1974 U.N.T.S. 317 (emphasis added). 
 123. Annex on Implementation and Verification, Convention on the Prohi-
bition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 103-21, 1974 U.N.T.S. 317 [hereinafter CWC Verification An-
nex]; see also Timothy K. Webster, The Future of the Chemical and Biological 
Weapons Conventions, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 187, 188–90 (2002) (dis-
cussing verification scheme). 
 124. CWC Verification Annex, supra note 123, pt. VI. 
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efits for medical treatment also may find application in new 
chemical weapons.125 
Nuclear technology presents further dual use challenges. 
Under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
states without nuclear weapons pledge not to manufacture or 
acquire such weapons.126 In exchange, these states receive as-
sistance in developing peaceful uses of nuclear energy.127 In-
deed, the treaty explicitly recognizes “the inalienable right of 
all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production 
and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.”128 The nuclear 
activities of non-nuclear-weapon states are subject to inspection 
to ensure that the activities are only for peaceful purposes, and 
noncompliance can prompt a referral to the U.N. Security 
Council.129 The treaty’s monitoring and enforcement provisions 
are relatively detailed and forceful, but implementation has 
sometimes proved difficult.130 As with the BWC and CWC, de-
liberate skirting of treaty provisions has revealed the difficulty 
of administering prohibitions that hinge on determining an ac-
tivity’s purpose.131 Most notoriously, Iran has undertaken ura-
nium enrichment and plutonium production for apparent mili-
tary purposes while asserting peaceful intentions.132  
Each of the just-discussed weapons regulatory regimes dis-
tinguishes between prohibited and permitted research based on 
 
 125. Alistair Burt, We Must Wake Up to the Threats of New Chemical 
Weapons, NEW SCIENTIST (Apr. 15, 2013) http://www.newscientist.com/article/ 
mg21829125.900-we-must-wake-up-to-the-threats-of-new-chemical-weapons 
.html. 
 126. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, art. 
II, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 21 U.S.T. 483. Other treaties governing nuclear weapons 
research include the Partial Test-Ban Treaty, which bans nuclear weapons 
tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water, and the Comprehen-
sive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which has not entered into force. Comprehen-
sive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Sept. 24, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-28 
(1997), 35 I.L.M. 1439; Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons in the Atmosphere, 
in Outer Space, and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 
43. 
 127. Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 126, at 
art. V. 
 128. Id. at art. IV.1. 
 129. Id. at art. III.1. 
 130. Joseph Cirincione, Enforcing Compliance with the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Mar. 24, 2005), http:// 
carnegieendowment.org/2005/03/24/enforcing-compliance-with-non 
-proliferation-treaty. 
 131. Id.  
 132. Spector, supra note 119, at 624–25. 
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the purpose of such research. The challenges of implementing 
these regimes offer several cautionary points for prospective 
geoengineering governance. A ban on research having a specific 
purpose will incentivize efforts to disguise the true purpose of 
otherwise prohibited research projects. Restrictions on research 
may require verification mechanisms to be effective. And much 
technical knowledge, including that produced by 
geoengineering research, has dual use potential. 
II.  EXISTING PROPOSALS TO GOVERN 
GEOENGINEERING RESEARCH—AND WHAT’S MISSING 
FROM THEM   
The deadlock on geoengineering research—and the corre-
sponding need to establish some form of governance for 
geoengineering research—is widely acknowledged.133 Various 
commentators have set forth governance proposals ranging 
from self-regulation to formal international oversight. A survey 
of these proposals identifies common elements and functions, 
and also reveals a shared neglect of systemic concerns. 
A. EXISTING PROPOSALS 
1. Overview of Selected Proposals 
A “widespread but quietly expressed” view in the 
geoengineering community advocates that governance of 
geoengineering research be left to ordinary scientific research 
governance processes, with no additional oversight by govern-
ment or other actors.134 Drawing on conventional notions of sci-
entific freedom, this view assumes that peer review, scientific 
community norms, and existing regulations will adequately ac-
count for risks and other concerns. However, this view is not 
universally held, even among scientists, and is often overshad-
owed by declarations calling for closer scrutiny and broader 
participation in governance.135 Leading proposals for govern-
 
 133. See Bellamy, supra note 51, at 21. 
 134. Parson & Keith, supra note 16; see Cicerone, supra note 46, at 223, 
225 (urging that geoengineering research proceed as “on any other scientific 
problem at least for theoretical and modeling studies,” while suggesting a 
moratorium “on large-scale field manipulations”). 
 135. See, e.g., Schäfer et al., supra note 20 (describing a letter to the editor 
noting that proposals for field testing generally “acknowledge a need for some 
form of governance”); Karen N. Scott, International Law in the Anthropocene: 
Responding to the Geoengineering Challenge, 35 MICH. J. INT’L LAW 309, 355 
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ance of geoengineering research generally incorporate a wide 
range of actors, including national governments or internation-
al organizations. Underlying these proposals is a recognition 
that geoengineering research differs from basic scientific re-
search in important ways that warrant additional external 
oversight. For one, large-scale field experiments, which might 
ultimately be necessary to assess effectiveness and risks, could 
affect millions of people. For another, the primary aim of 
geoengineering research is to develop and implement specific 
technologies. If undertaken without sufficient oversight and ac-
countability, such goal-directed research could unwittingly 
commit the global community to an undesirable course of ac-
tion.  
Perhaps the foremost effort to focus attention on the specif-
ic issue of governing geoengineering research is the Solar Radi-
ation Management Governance Initiative (SRMGI).136 As its 
name suggests, the SRMGI concentrates on SRM, and its ini-
tial purpose was “to develop specific governance recommenda-
tions for SRM research.”137 However, the initiative has since 
modified its orientation toward “open[ing] up” discussions of 
SRM governance by exploring and recording different perspec-
tives, rather than preemptively “closing down” discussions and 
producing definitive prescriptions.138  
In 2011, the SRMGI organized a conference to explore the 
challenges raised by SRM research.139 Although organizers dis-
claimed any effort to reach a consensus, a summary report 
identified general governance considerations, including possible 
functions and alternative approaches.140 The report suggested 
categorizing research into five groups according to potential 
risk: (1) computer and desk studies involving no potential envi-
ronmental impact; (2) laboratory studies or passive observa-
tions of nature; (3) small field trials having no significant large 
scale effects; (4) medium and large-scale field trials; and (5) de-
 
(2013) (contending that self-regulation “does not represent an appropriate 
governance mechanism”). 
 136. See SOLAR RADIATION MGMT. GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, supra note 46, 
at 11. The SRMGI is an ongoing partnership between the Royal Society, Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund, and The World Academy of Science (TWAS). See id. 
at 7.  
 137. Id. at 12. 
 138. Id. at 12, box 1.1. 
 139. See id. at 11–12. 
 140. Id. at 29–44. 
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ployment.141 The report characterized the first three categories 
as involving “negligible direct risk” and the latter two catego-
ries as involving “potentially direct risk.”142 While noting that 
physical risk is “not the only consideration” relevant to govern-
ance, the report described general agreement among conference 
participants on the need for “differentiated governance ar-
rangements for different kinds of SRM activity.”143 A more lim-
ited approach might increase oversight in proportion to the 
physical risks of research, whereas a more proactive approach 
might consider more broadly the indirect risks of research and 
“pursue early progress towards a more comprehensive govern-
ance framework.”144 
The SRMGI has refrained from advocating a specific pro-
posal for geoengineering research governance, but others have 
not. Proposals vary in their details but frequently contain the 
following elements: a coordinating role for governments, a gov-
ernment advisory committee on geoengineering research, a 
moratorium on some or all field experiments, a permitting sys-
tem to govern allowed field experiments, and compensation for 
harms.  
Governments could take an active role in organizing or 
promoting geoengineering research, as some proposals advo-
cate.145 Government leadership would address concerns that 
current research is insufficient or poorly prioritized. On a na-
tional basis, governments can coordinate existing research, set 
research priorities, and help ensure that policymakers make in-
formed decisions.146 Internationally, cost-sharing arrangements 
or cooperative research programs can stimulate national spend-
ing and promote more cost-effective research.147 International 
cooperation can also coordinate field experiments so that they 
do not interfere with one another.148 More generally, formal 
 
 141. Id. at 25–26. The report recognized that SRM research activities could 
be organized in other ways, but explained that the categorization described 
above was used and developed in conference discussions and “has the ad-
vantages of being clear, accessible, and reflecting the full range of potential 
SRM research activities.” Id. at 25, 27. 
 142. See id. at 26. 
 143. Id. at 25, 27. 
 144. Id. at 55. 
 145. See Bodansky, supra note 21, at 546. 
 146. See GAO-10-903, supra note 61, at 39; GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OF-
FICE, supra note 52, at 55. 
 147. See Bodansky, supra note 21, at 546. 
 148. See BODLE ET AL., supra note 21, at 128. 
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government involvement can provide legitimacy to research ac-
tivities, which might otherwise be perceived as rogue experi-
ments.149 
Under several proposals, an advisory committee on 
geoengineering research would provide expert advice to gov-
ernments regarding oversight, policies, and practices.150 A 2011 
proposal from the Bipartisan Policy Center’s (BPC) Task Force 
on Climate Remediation Research advocates a committee to 
provide advice on setting up an adequate research program, 
regulating the risks of field experiments, and conducting public 
outreach.151 This proposal takes the perspective that present re-
search efforts are an insufficient response to climate change 
and thus anticipates “little, if any, special scrutiny on a project-
by-project basis” for “low-risk early research.”152 Another pro-
posal for an advisory committee, from David E. Winickoff and 
Mark B. Brown, urges a generally more cautious approach than 
the BPC. Winickoff and Brown’s proposed advisory committee 
would “provide detailed advice to the Executive Branch and 
government agencies on an oversight framework before the con-
ception and funding of geoengineering research.”153 Emphasiz-
ing the importance of developing trusted institutions and pro-
cedures for addressing this controversial subject, Winickoff and 
Brown describe “promot[ion of] public deliberation and debate 
about values and goals” as a critical function of their proposed 
committee.154 
A moratorium on some or all field experiments is an ele-
ment of many proposals. Edward A. Parson and David W. Keith 
suggest, for example, distinguishing between projects based on 
two thresholds of scale and risk: geoengineering projects and 
field experiments beyond a “large” threshold would be subject 
 
 149. See Bodansky, supra note 21, at 546. 
 150. In addition to the proposals discussed above, see Jane C.S. Long & 
Dane Scott, Vested Interests and Geoengineering Research, ISSUES SCI. & 
TECH., 2013, at 45, 45–52 (suggesting that an independent advisory board 
could develop standards and norms for transparency and research manage-
ment), and Parson & Ernst, supra note 32, at 335 (suggesting a “World Com-
mission on Climate Engineering” to advise governments and international or-
ganizations, elicit stakeholder and citizen input, and undertake other tasks). 
 151. BPC, supra note 52, at 19. 
 152. Id. at 20.  
 153. Winickoff & Brown, supra note 5, at 83 (emphasis added). In contrast, 
another proposal would insist on a governance framework as a precondition 
only for field research outside an “‘allowed zone’ of experimental parameters 
and expected effects.” Morgan et al., supra note 51, at 37, 41. 
 154. Winickoff & Brown, supra note 5, at 84. 
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to a moratorium, whereas field experiments below a “small-
scale” threshold would be allowed to proceed if they comply 
with transparency requirements and environmental, health, 
and safety rules.155 Parson and Keith sidestep the issue of how 
to govern experiments falling between these two thresholds and 
focus instead on creating operating space for small, low-risk re-
search. To that end, they contend the proposed moratorium 
should “be long and firm enough to allay concern that small re-
search will slide unexamined into deployment.”156 Other com-
mentators urge a broader moratorium on all field testing to al-
low further public deliberation on geoengineering to occur 
first.157 
Various proposals also include a permitting system or some 
other form of external control. Some proposals would require a 
permit for all geoengineering field experiments,158 whereas oth-
ers would require a permit only for experiments exceeding spec-
ified thresholds of scale or risk.159 Permitting is commonly con-
templated at the national level, but international oversight for 
field experiments having international significance or 
transboundary effects is also possible.160 A permit requirement 
 
 155. Parson & Keith, supra note 16, at 1279. Overall, Parson and Keith 
recommend that research be subject to governance “backed by government au-
thority and coordinated internationally,” perhaps through “informal consulta-
tion and coordinated decisions by research-funding and regulatory agencies of 
participating governments.” Id.; cf. Ian D. Lloyd & Michael Oppenheimer, On 
the Design of an International Governance Framework for Geoengineering, 
GLOBAL ENVTL. POL., May 2014, at 45, 53–57 (proposing a similar approach in 
which small-scale experiments would be frequently permitted, large-scale ex-
periments with potential transboundary effects would be banned initially but 
occasionally permitted as knowledge increases, and large-scale deployment 
would be permitted only with consensus approval).  
 156. Parson & Keith, supra note 16, at 1279.  
 157. See ETC GRP., GEOPIRACY: THE CASE AGAINST GEOENGINEERING 40 
(2010) (urging a moratorium “on all geoengineering activities outside the la-
boratory” “[u]ntil there has been a full debate on the course all countries wish 
to go”); Clive Hamilton, No, We Should Not Just “At Least Do the Research,” 
496 NATURE 139, 139 (2013) (identifying various questions to be answered be-
fore further research is undertaken); Michael Zürn & Stefan Schäfer, The 
Paradox of Climate Engineering, 4 GLOBAL POL’Y 266, 274 (2013) (proposing a 
“time-limited moratorium” on field testing). 
 158. See, e.g., BODLE ET AL., supra note 21, at 142. 
 159. See, e.g., Parson & Ernst, supra note 32, at 326; cf. ROYAL SOC’Y, su-
pra note 28, at 41 (contending “[t]here is a clear need for governance of re-
search involving large-scale field testing,” without specifying the form such 
governance might take). 
 160. See HOUSE OF COMMONS SCI. & TECH. COMM., THE REGULATION OF 
GEOENGINEERING 38 (2010) (U.K.) (suggesting that “small tests of SRM 
geoengineering” having negligible or predictable environmental impacts and 
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can ensure prior assessment, mitigation, and monitoring of a 
field experiment’s environmental impacts.161 Such a require-
ment would build on actions already taken under the LC/LP 
and CBD.162 As noted above, the permitting contemplated under 
the LC/LP is limited to scientific research on ocean fertilization 
and other marine geoengineering techniques.163 Meanwhile, the 
decision by the CBD parties allows for small-scale scientific re-
search studies “conducted in a controlled setting,” but does 
nothing to establish a permitting scheme.164 
Finally, some proposals suggest the creation of a liability 
and compensation system to address harms that might result 
from field experiments.165 Geoengineering deployment raises li-
ability concerns most pointedly,166 but field experiments also 
could have adverse environmental consequences warranting 
compensation.167 Designing a compensation system would re-
quire the resolution of difficult questions of harm, causation, 
and responsibility.168  
 
no transboundary effects be allowed if in accordance with internationally ac-
cepted principles, and that larger scale tests be regulated). 
 161. See Resolution LP.4(8), supra note 82, annex 4, at 8; Parson & Ernst, 
supra note 32, at 327. 
 162. See Till Markus & Harald Ginzky, Regulating Climate Engineering: 
Paradigmatic Aspects of the Regulation of Ocean Fertilization, 4 CARBON & 
CLIMATE L. REV. 477, 484–86 (2011) (discussing how assessment framework 
for evaluating ocean fertilization experiments could serve as a model for other 
geoengineering regulatory efforts). 
 163. Resolution LP.4(8), supra note 82. 
 164. Decision by the Parties to the CBD, supra note 87, ¶ 8(w). 
 165. See Joshua B. Horton et al., Liability for Solar Geoengineering: Histor-
ical Precedents, Contemporary Innovations, and Governance Possibilities, 22 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 225, 237–45 (2015); Parson & Ernst, supra note 32, at 326; 
Jesse L. Reynolds, An Economic Analysis of Liability and Compensation for 
Harm from Large-Scale Field Research in Solar Climate Engineering, 5 CLI-
MATE L. 182, 192–202 (2015). 
 166. See, e.g., Toby Svoboda & Peter J. Irvine, Ethical and Technical Chal-
lenges in Compensating for Harm Due to Solar Radiation Management 
Geoengineering, 17 ETHICS POL’Y & ENV’T 157 (2014); Joshua B. Horton et al., 
Solar Geoengineering and the Problem of Liability, GEOENGINEERING OUR 
CLIMATE? (Nov. 19, 2013), http://geoengineeringourclimate.files.wordpress 
.com/2013/11/horton-et-al-2013-solar-geoengineering-and-the-problem-of 
-liability-click-for-download.pdf; Pak-Hang Wong et al., Compensation for 
Geoengineering Harms and No-Fault Climate Change Compensation (Climate 
Geoengineering Governance Working Paper Series, Paper No. 003, 2014), 
http://geoengineering-governance-research.org/perch/resources/ 
workingpaper8wongdouglassavulescucompensationfinal-.pdf. 
 167. See Dilling & Hauser, supra note 20, at 557. 
 168. See id.; Parson & Ernst, supra note 32, at 326; Svoboda & Irvine, su-
pra note 166, at 161–70. 
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2. Existing Proposals Focus on Physical Risks 
Viewed collectively, existing proposals for governing 
geoengineering research focus on physical risks.169 This focus is 
apparent from what these proposals do—and do not—contain. 
First, no proposals call for oversight of indoor research. Such 
research poses virtually no threat of physical harm, and its 
regulation in any case is politically unlikely.170 Second, pro-
posals to regulate field experiments generally tailor the amount 
of scrutiny to the scale of the experiment and expected ef-
fects.171 The most stringent oversight would correspond to ex-
periments posing the greatest potential physical risk, whereas 
experiments posing little potential physical risk would likely 
escape oversight altogether. The scope of proposed moratoria on 
field experiments further illustrates the emphasis on physical 
risk. For instance, Parson and Keith’s proposed moratorium 
would apply only to those field experiments whose effects sur-
pass defined thresholds of damage or risk. In sum, each of the-
se features reflects a desire to strike a balance between the in-
formation that field tests might offer and the environmental 
harm that may result.172 
Undoubtedly, the physical risks of geoengineering warrant 
substantial attention. Ocean fertilization could wreak havoc on 
marine ecosystems.173 The release of stratospheric aerosols 
 
 169. Cf. Rob Bellamy, Beyond Climate Control: “Opening Up” Propositions 
for Geoengineering Governance (Climate Geoengineering Governance Working 
Paper Series, Paper No. 11, 2014), http://www.geoengineering-governance 
-research.org/perch/resources/workingpaper11bellamybeyondclimatecontrol 
.pdf (observing that geoengineering appraisals “have largely taken the form of 
reductive ‘expert-analytic’ approaches such as computer modelling, cost-
benefit analysis, expert review and multi-criteria analysis that treat the issue 
as one of simple ‘risk’ rather than one of indeterminate uncertainty, ambiguity 
or ignorance” (internal citations omitted)). 
 170. See, e.g., HOUSE OF COMMONS SCI. & TECH. COMM., supra note 160, at 
37. 
 171. Cf. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 13 (recommending 
that research governance “consider the need for increasing supervision as the 
scope and scale of the research and its potential implications increase”). 
 172. See Parsons & Ernst, supra note 32, at 328 (contending that govern-
ance decisions “must have a substantially scientific character” because 
“[d]ecisions whether to authorize proposed research interventions will need to 
be informed by judgments of their scientific promise and the balance between 
the knowledge they offer and the scale of environmental disruption they im-
pose”). 
 173. See ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 28, at 17–18; Mary W. Silver et al., Toxic 
Diatoms and Domoic Acid in Natural and Iron Enriched Waters of the Oceanic 
Pacific, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 20762, at 20763–64 (2010). 
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could interfere with monsoon patterns and exacerbate depletion 
of the ozone layer.174 Similarly, enhancing cloud albedo could al-
ter regional precipitation and temperature patterns.175 Thanks 
to the uncertainties associated with individual geoengineering 
techniques and the Earth’s climate systems, other, as-yet unan-
ticipated physical risks also may emerge. Moreover, physical 
risks are not confined to full-scale deployment. Field experi-
ments, too, may be of sufficient scale or effect to present signifi-
cant physical hazards, thereby warranting concern and close 
scrutiny.  
Physical risks are not the only concerns that 
geoengineering research raises, however. Transparency and 
public deliberation—or a lack thereof—are two concerns that 
some geoengineering research governance proposals 
acknowledge as well. Potential mechanisms to foster transpar-
ency include education, media outreach, and a public registry 
that would give advance notice of geoengineering field trials 
and disclose research results.176 Mechanisms to engage the pub-
lic in decision making, as opposed to merely providing infor-
mation, might include discussion groups, citizen panels, or pub-
lic comment processes.177 The principles of transparency and de-
deliberation feature prominently in the Oxford Principles, a 
widely cited set of general principles for geoengineering gov-
ernance. With respect to transparency, the Oxford Principles 
encourage “complete disclosure of research plans and open pub-
lication of results.”178 And to promote public deliberation, the 
 
 174. See ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 28, at 31; Simone Tilmes et al., The Sen-
sitivity of Polar Ozone Depletion to Proposed Geoengineering Schemes, 320 
SCIENCE 1201, 1203–04 (2008). 
 175. See ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 28, at 28; John Latham et al., Global 
Temperature Stabilization Via Controlled Albedo Enhancement of Low-Level 
Maritime Clouds, 366 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 3969, 3982–83 
(2008). 
 176. See Dilling & Hauser, supra note 20, at 559; Parson & Keith, supra 
note 16, at 1279; see also BPC, supra note 52, at 14 (recommending develop-
ment of “transparency protocols for all potentially risky forms of climate re-
mediation research”); Morgan et al., supra note 51, at 42 (recommending a 
code of best practices that would include a commitment to publicize SRM re-
search activities on a common website). 
 177. See Dilling & Hauser, supra note 20, at 559–60; see also Winickoff & 
Brown, supra note 5, at 84 (suggesting that a proposed government advisory 
committee promote public deliberation regarding geoengineering goals).  
 178. Rayner et al., supra note 56, at 503; cf. ASILOMAR SCI. ORG. COMM., 
THE ASILOMAR CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATIONS ON PRINCIPLES FOR RE-
SEARCH INTO CLIMATE ENGINEERING TECHNIQUES 9 (2010) (recommending 
that geoengineering research “be conducted openly and cooperatively,” with 
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principles counsel that “those conducting geoengineering re-
search . . . be required to notify, consult, and ideally obtain the 
prior informed consent of, those affected by the research activi-
ties.”179  
B. WHAT’S MISSING: OTHER CONCERNS RAISED BY RESEARCH 
Ensuring that geoengineering field experiments do not 
present unacceptable physical risks is essential, as is informing 
and engaging the public regarding such experiments that do 
occur. Geoengineering research governance proposals typically 
seek to address these concerns on a project-by-project basis. 
Through the review of individual field experiments, society pre-
sumably can guard against physical harm to humans or the en-
vironment. A review process for individual experiments also 
would provide a concrete setting for implementing measures to 
promote transparency and public engagement. 
Merely attending to physical risks and providing avenues 
for public participation are not sufficient, however. Existing 
governance proposals largely fail to address the big-picture 
concerns geoengineering research raises. I refer to these con-
cerns as systemic concerns, as they arise from the sum of 
geoengineering research efforts rather than any individual ex-
periment. Systemic concerns are apparent in the public re-
sponse to the SPICE project—which engaged stakeholders and 
posed virtually no physical risks yet triggered pointed opposi-
tion.180 The public, sensitive to the project’s significance within 
a broader developmental trajectory, worries that such research 
will lead society down a slippery slope to deployment. The slip-
pery slope concern and the related phenomenon of technological 
lock-in are not the only systemic concerns associated with 
geoengineering research. Other systemic concerns include the 
potential for geoengineering to undermine mitigation efforts 
(often referred to as a “moral hazard”), and the heightened pro-
spects for military conflict as geoengineering experimentation 
and deployment proceed. Ultimately, research does not produce 
knowledge in a vacuum; rather, it alters the context in which 
 
“[p]ublic participation and consultation in research planning and oversight”); 
BPC, supra note 52, at 14 (identifying transparency as an important basic 
principle that should govern geoengineering research).  
 179. Rayner et al., supra note 56, at 502. 
 180. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
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society makes policy decisions and may predispose society to 
particular courses of action.181  
1. Lock-in 
Through its co-evolution with social, institutional, cultural, 
and political systems, a technology can become dominant and 
difficult to dislodge, or “locked in.”182 Lock-in often results not 
from obvious technical superiority but rather from processes of 
path-dependence. Self-reinforcing processes can amplify minor 
but early advantages or chance circumstances into subsequent 
dominance.183 Specifically, a technology may benefit from eco-
nomic factors such as economies of scale, learning effects, and 
other positive feedback processes.184 Political and social factors 
also may contribute to lock-in, as politicians, agencies, firms, 
and other parties become invested in establishing and perpetu-
ating a particular technology,185 and as social paradigms and 
everyday practices contribute to a technology’s acceptance.186  
To some degree, lock-in is a necessary and unavoidable fea-
ture of innovation.187 Sizable investments and commitments are 
 
 181. See Rayner et al., supra note 56, at 502 (“These considerations suggest 
that the issue of social control over the technologies is vital in deciding wheth-
er to proceed with geoengineering research. Public resistance to new technolo-
gy is seldom only about the probability of death or physical injury from a tech-
nology.”). 
 182. See Ivan Scrase & Gordon MacKerron, Lock-In, in ENERGY FOR THE 
FUTURE: A NEW AGENDA 89, 90 (Ivan Scrase & Gordon MacKerron eds., 2009); 
see also Rose C. Cairns, Climate Geoengineering: Issues of Path-Dependence 
and Socio-Technical Lock-In, 5 WIRES CLIMATE CHANGE 649, 650–51 (2014). 
 183. See Cairns, supra note 182, at 650. 
 184. See id.; Scrase & MacKerron, supra note 182, at 91; see also W. Brian 
Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Histori-
cal Events, 99 ECON. J. 116, 116 (1989) (“Modern, complex technologies often 
display increasing returns to adoption in that the more they are adopted, the 
more experience is gained with them, and the more they are improved.”). 
Learning effects refer to product improvements and cost reductions resulting 
from the accumulation of specialized skills and knowledge. See Timothy J. 
Foxon, Technological Lock-In and the Role of Innovation, in HANDBOOK OF 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 140, 142 (Giles Atkinson et al. eds., 2007).  
 185. See Scrase & MacKerron, supra note 182, at 90, 94. Policies, regulato-
ry frameworks, and political institutions can be resistant to change because of 
high start-up costs, complex and opaque interactions, and the ability to use 
political authority to enhance one’s own power. See Foxon, supra note 184, at 
144. 
 186. See Cairns, supra note 182, at 650. 
 187. See William Walker, Entrapment in Large Technology Systems: Insti-
tutional Commitment and Power Relations, 29 RES. POL’Y 833, 834, 846 
(2000). 
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essential for technologies to take root. Society faces a funda-
mental dilemma in deciding whether to adopt an emerging 
technology, however, because its negative consequences often 
are not known or salient at the outset. Once a technology is 
locked in, those consequences can be difficult to avoid or ad-
dress.188 The unavoidable delay in identifying a technology’s ad-
verse effects undermines rational decision making. A technolo-
gy may achieve dominance not because it is optimal, but 
because it possessed an initial competitive advantage. As a re-
sult, “the unfit can attract huge investment and can survive 
long after they should have been sent to the grave.”189 
Global dependence on fossil fuel-based energy systems pro-
vides a straightforward illustration of lock-in.190 Existing ener-
gy systems are deeply resistant to change because of their long-
lived and extensive infrastructure, as well as their complex and 
interrelated components.191 In addition, these systems are oper-
ated by powerful stakeholders whose interests are tied to per-
petuating the status quo.192 As a result of lock-in, fuel use in fu-
ture decades “is already determined by investment decisions 
made over the last decade and more.”193 Rapid and widespread 
adoption of alternative energy systems to mitigate climate 
change or reduce fossil fuel dependence is difficult, if not im-
possible. 
Although economists developed the concept of lock-in to 
explain the dominance of inferior technologies in competitive 
markets,194 the concept can apply in other contexts as well. In 
geoengineering policy discussions, lock-in refers to a variety of 
concerns—social and cognitive—regarding premature and 
suboptimal commitments to one or more geoengineering tech-
 
 188. DAVID COLLINGRIDGE, THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF TECHNOLOGY 16–19 
(1980); Cairns, supra note 182, at 650. 
 189. Walker, supra note 187, at 834. 
 190. See Gregory C. Unruh, Understanding Carbon Lock-In, 28 ENERGY 
POL’Y 817, 818 (2000); see also Simon Shackley & Michael Thompson, Lost in 
the Mix: Will the Technologies of Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage Provide 
Us with a Breathing Space As We Strive To Make the Transition from Fossil 
Fuels to Renewables?, 110 CLIMATIC CHANGE 101, 103–12 (2012) (discussing a 
concern that carbon capture and storage will reinforce carbon lock-in). 
 191. See Albert C. Lin, Lessons from the Past for Assessing Energy Technol-
ogies for the Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1814, 1820 (2014). 
 192. See id. 
 193. Scrase & MacKerron, supra note 182, at 95. 
 194. See Arthur, supra note 184, at 126–27 (suggesting adoption of the 
QWERTY typewriter keyboard and other examples). 
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niques.195 Social lock-in describes the concern that some 
geoengineering technologies would require sizable capital in-
vestments and physical infrastructure and thus foster the crea-
tion of vested interests in their continuation.196 Even substan-
tial research into a specific technique could create scientific and 
commercial interests favoring further research and perhaps 
implementation.197 Cognitive lock-in characterizes the worry 
that the social framing of geoengineering can conceal value 
judgments and unduly influence assessments of 
geoengineering.198 For example, a focus on certain 
geoengineering proposals could prematurely foreclose consider-
ation of other geoengineering options. The disproportionate at-
tention currently being devoted to stratospheric aerosols is of 
particular concern.199 More generally, the discussion of any 
geoengineering technique could steer attention away from non-
geoengineering alternatives for responding to climate change—
a moral hazard concern discussed below.200 Further, the mere 
study of geoengineering could even make its deployment more 
likely.201 Thus, one report on SRM worries that “[e]ven very 
basic and safe research . . . could be a first step onto a ‘slippery 
slope,’” creating momentum and a scientific lobbying constitu-
ency for development and eventual deployment.202 
 
 195. See Cairns, supra note 182, at 651. In addition to the lock-in concerns 
associated with geoengineering research discussed above, deployment of 
geoengineering raises a further lock-in concern regarding the drastic climate 
consequences of terminating an SRM scheme once it has been in place. See in-
fra text accompanying notes 329–30. 
 196. See Cairns, supra note 182, at 651. David Keith, a leading proponent 
of field research on stratospheric aerosol release, acknowledges institutional 
lock-in to be a “strong argument” against experiments posing little risk. See 
KEITH, supra note 34, at 151. 
 197. See David R. Morrow et al., Toward Ethical Norms and Institutions 
for Climate Engineering Research, 4 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS, Oct. 2009, at 3. 
 198. See Rob Bellamy et al., A Review of Climate Geoengineering Apprais-
als, 3 WIRES CLIMATE CHANGE 597, 610–11 (2012); Cairns, supra note 182, at 
651–52. 
 199. See Bellamy et al., supra note 198, at 608. 
 200. See id. at 609. Bellamy et al. further caution that the contextual fram-
ing of geoengineering as a response to a climate emergency could “artificially 
enhance the perceived acceptability of geoengineering proposals.” Id. 
 201. See Cairns, supra note 182, at 652. 
 202. SOLAR RADIATION MGMT. GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, supra note 46, at 
21. 
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2. Moral Hazard 
Geoengineering research presents a second systemic con-
cern, commonly referred to as moral hazard. Geoengineering 
can offer no more than a partial response to climate change. 
SRM techniques would “fail to precisely undo the environmen-
tal disruptions caused by elevated GHGs” and would do noth-
ing to combat the ocean acidification that rising carbon levels 
cause.203 CDR techniques would require intense and protracted 
efforts to remove relatively modest amounts of carbon from the 
atmosphere.204 Accordingly, even if geoengineering were to be 
deployed, GHG emissions reductions (commonly referred to as 
mitigation) would remain essential.205 In this context, moral 
hazard refers to the potential for geoengineering research and 
development activities to undermine mitigation efforts and 
public support for such efforts.206 Specifically, geoengineering—
or the prospect of geoengineering—may divert attention and 
resources away from mitigation, undermine incentives to re-
duce behaviors that generate carbon emissions, or encourage 
political inaction.207 The moral hazard concern has both psycho-
logical and political components. Psychologically, people may 
misperceive geoengineering as a simple yet comprehensive so-
lution to climate change and thereby view mitigation as less 
urgent or even unnecessary.208 The extent of this effect is open 
to debate as an empirical matter, but psychological tendencies 
 
 203. See Parson & Ernst, supra note 32. 
 204. See Albert C. Lin, Does Geoengineering Present a Moral Hazard?, 40 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 673, 676–77 (2013); Parson & Ernst, supra note 32, at 313 (dis-
cussing “low leverage” characteristics of CDR techniques). 
 205. Geoengineering researchers generally agree on this point. See, e.g., 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 13; ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 28, at 
ix (“No geoengineering method can provide an easy or readily acceptable al-
ternative solution to the problem of climate change.”); Martin Bunzl, Research-
ing Geoengineering: Should Not or Could Not?, 4 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS, Oct. 
2009, at 1, 2; Michael MacCracken et al., Asilomar International Conference 
on Climate Intervention Technologies, Statement from the Conference’s Scien-
tific Organizing Committee (Mar. 26, 2010), http://www.whoi.edu/fileserver 
.do?id=62483&pt=10&p=39472. 
 206. See Lin, supra note 204, at 674; David R. Morrow, Ethical Aspects of 
the Mitigation Obstruction Argument Against Climate Engineering Research, 
372 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A, Nov. 17, 2014, at 2. 
 207. See Stefan Schäfer et al., Earth’s Future in the Anthropocene: Techno-
logical Interventions Between Piecemeal and Utopian Social Engineering, 2 
EARTH’S FUTURE 239, 242 (2014). For a discussion regarding whether de-
creased mitigation would lead to a worse outcome, see Morrow, supra note 
206, at 3–11. 
 208. See Lin, supra note 204, at 678. 
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toward overconfidence and procrastination suggest its plausi-
bility.209 Politically, geoengineering might offer elected officials 
an easy excuse for avoiding difficult choices that could impose 
significant costs or require substantial changes in current life-
styles and the global economy.210 Why pay the price of mitiga-
tion today, politicians might contend, if a seemingly inexpen-
sive technological fix lies just over the horizon?  
Like lock-in, moral hazard is a systemic concern in that it 
arises from the overall course of geoengineering research rather 
than from any individual field trial. An ongoing research pro-
gram, including advancing field experimentation, might offer 
political cover for officials to sustain claims that a technological 
fix is on the way and that mitigation is unnecessary. 
3. Increased Conflict 
Geoengineering research—especially research into the 
faster-acting SRM techniques—raises a further systemic con-
cern: the potential use of such techniques in military conflict. 
The military, appreciating the importance of weather to battle-
field success, has a deep and long-standing interest in weather 
and climate control.211 It is thus not surprising that the U.S. 
 
 209. Compare Lin, supra note 204, at 694–701 (discussing psychological 
influences on risk perception), with Jesse Reynolds, A Critical Examination of 
the Climate Engineering Moral Hazard and Risk Compensation Concern, 2 
ANTHROPOCENE REV. 174, 185 (2015) (arguing that empirical evidence of mor-
al hazard and risk compensation is “not fully conclusive”). 
 210. See STEPHEN M. GARDINER, A PERFECT MORAL STORM: THE ETHICAL 
TRAGEDY OF CLIMATE CHANGE 364 (2011) (warning that a policy of modest 
geoengineering research, but not deployment, “is the approach most compati-
ble with continued intergenerational buck-passing” because it would impose 
minimal costs and risks to the present generation); Lin, supra note 204, at 
707; Robert L. Olson, Soft Geoengineering: A Gentler Approach to Addressing 
Climate Change, ENVIRONMENT, Sept./Oct. 2012, at 29, 30 (“Another key con-
cern is that if politicians come to believe that geoengineering provides a low-
cost ‘tech fix’ for climate change, it could give them a perfect excuse to back off 
from efforts to cut emissions.”); Edward A. Parson, Reflections on Air Capture: 
The Political Economy of Active Intervention in the Global Environment, 74 
CLIMATIC CHANGE 5, 8 (2006). 
 211. See generally JAMES RODGER FLEMING, FIXING THE SKY: THE CHECK-
ERED HISTORY OF WEATHER AND CLIMATE CONTROL 165–88 (2010) (detailing 
military interest in cloud seeding, hurricane modification, and other forms of 
weather modification). The ENMOD Convention prohibits the “military or any 
other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, 
long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury” to 
other states. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile 
Use of Environmental Modification Techniques art. I, opened for signature 
May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151. 
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military has expressed interest in the subject of 
geoengineering.212 Current geoengineering research has a 
peaceful aim of countering the effects of climate change, and it 
is not at all certain that geoengineering-based applications 
would have sufficient precision to be useful in war.213 Nonethe-
less, as experience with other dual-use technologies suggests, 
the military might use the information generated from such re-
search to develop weapons and other wartime applications.214 
Geoengineering technologies with regional effects may be of 
particular interest because of their potential for altering the 
weather or climate of rival nations.215  
Aside from direct military applications, geoengineering re-
search also could foster global conflict by creating a new bone of 
geopolitical contention. For one, states might view another 
country’s unilateral pursuit of geoengineering research as con-
trary to their interests and as a precursor to unilateral deploy-
ment.216 Field tests could heighten tensions or lead to preemp-
tive strikes, and deployment could provoke retaliatory 
measures.217 Moreover, even if geoengineering techniques were 
successfully and peacefully developed, a slate of difficult if not 
ungovernable issues regarding their potential deployment 
would arise. The metaphor of a global thermostat, though mis-
leading in the degree of control it suggests, captures some of 
the likely conflict.218 Just as individuals may disagree over a 
 
 212. See Morrow et al., supra note 197. 
 213. See Achim Maas & Jürgen Scheffran, Climate Conflicts 2.0? Climate 
Engineering as a Challenge for International Peace and Security, 20 
SICHERHEIT & FRIEDEN 193, 196 (2012) (reasoning deliberate military use of 
geoengineering is unlikely because of potential for large collateral damage, 
time delay between deployment and results, and highly indirect effects); Steve 
Rayner, To Know or Not To Know? A Note on Ignorance as a Rhetorical Re-
source in Geoengineering Debates 8 (Climate Geoengineering Governance 
Working Paper Series, Paper No. 10, 2014), http://geoengineering-governance 
-research.org/perch/resources/workingpaper10raynertoknowornottoknow-1.pdf 
(noting tension between assertions that solar geoengineering is uncontrollable 
and the high degree of control that successful weaponization would require). 
 214. See supra Part I.C (discussing the dual use of biological research for 
offensive and medical purposes). 
 215. See Morrow et al., supra note 197; Robock, supra note 67, at 227. 
 216. See Adam Corner & Nick Pidgeon, Geoengineering the Climate: The 
Social and Ethical Implications, ENVIRONMENT, Jan./Feb. 2010, at 24, 30. 
 217. See Bodansky, supra note 21, at 549 (suggesting that retaliation might 
include measures to warm the climate back up). 
 218. See Albert Lin, Geoengineering’s Thermostat Dilemma, in THE LAW OF 
THE FUTURE AND THE FUTURE OF LAW: VOLUME II 173–74 (Sam Muller et al. 
eds., 2012). 
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thermostat setting, nations may disagree over whether to de-
ploy geoengineering at all; if so, when and how deployment 
should occur; and how to make such decisions.219 If these issues 
are inherently ungovernable, perhaps the prudent course would 
be to avoid developing a technology that would only sow the 
seeds of future conflict.220 Ignorance, in this instance, could be a 
virtue.221 
A counterargument can be made, however, that ignorance 
may not be an option if would-be geoengineering researchers 
are determined to press forward. Furthermore, ignorance re-
garding a geoengineering technique or its risks might not pre-
vent poorly informed deployment.222 As climate change becomes 
more severe, the international community or an individual na-
tion might turn in desperation to an unproven geoengineering 
technique. Such a move could lead to international disputes as 
well as unexpected consequences.223 The critical premise under-
lying this argument is that research will yield adequate infor-
mation to support prudent, consensus-based decision making. 
Even if research is done, however, substantial uncertainties re-
garding the effects of possible climate interventions are likely 
to remain.224 In any case, disagreements regarding how to pro-
ceed will persist, and research may create a false sense of secu-
rity that exacerbates such disagreements.225  
 
 219. See MIKE HULME, CAN SCIENCE FIX CLIMATE CHANGE?: A CASE 
AGAINST CLIMATE ENGINEERING 60 (2014); Lin, supra note 218, at 175; Phil 
Macnaghten & Bronislaw Szerszynski, Living the Global Social Experiment: 
An Analysis of Public Discourse on Solar Radiation Management and Its Im-
plications for Governance, 23 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 465, 472 (2013); Parson 
& Ernst, supra note 32, at 330.  
 220. Cf. HULME, supra note 219, at 81–82 (contending that stratospheric 
aerosol deployment should not be researched if it cannot be governed in an ac-
ceptable manner).  
 221. See Rayner, supra note 213, at 12–13. 
 222. See, e.g., SOLAR RADIATION MGMT. GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, supra 
note 46, at 20. 
 223. See id. at 20–21. 
 224. See Rayner, supra note 213, at 7; Szerszynski et al., supra note 43, at 
2811 (suggesting that SRM “[d]eployment will thus always have the character 
of research”). 
 225. See Rayner, supra note 213, at 12–13 (describing such concern among 
opponents of geoengineering research). 
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III.  A PROPOSAL FOR GEOENGINEERING RESEARCH 
GOVERNANCE   
Governance should address both the systemic concerns and 
physical risks associated with geoengineering research. This 
Part sketches out the desired characteristics of a research gov-
ernance structure, surveys issues of governance design, and 
then sets forth a specific proposal. 
A. DESIRED CHARACTERISTICS OF RESEARCH GOVERNANCE 
What characteristics should a geoengineering research 
governance regime have? First, governance should be legiti-
mate and perceived as such. Second, governance should effec-
tively address the concerns raised by geoengineering research.  
1. Legitimacy 
Efforts by the scientific community and by nongovernmen-
tal institutions to develop governance mechanisms, however 
well-intended, have been lacking in legitimacy. The SPICE field 
experiment ran into trouble, but not for lack of conventional 
scientific oversight. Indeed, the experiment was subject to re-
view processes beyond those typically applied to university re-
search.226 This oversight nevertheless was perceived as inade-
quate to account for the broader social concerns surrounding 
SRM.227 Laypersons questioned the experiment’s justification, 
given the limited information the experiment would provide 
and the subsequent research it seemed to presume.228 They also 
voiced strong support for international regulatory structures to 
shape this and any subsequent SRM field experiments.229 The 
conflict-of-interest concerns that ultimately sank the experi-
ment only underscore the need for external oversight that 
would be widely accepted as legitimate. 
The incorporation of various features—independence, 
transparency, public participation, and accountability—all can 
contribute to a governance structure’s legitimacy.230 Independ-
 
 226. See Pidgeon et al., supra note 3 (discussing “Stagegate” evaluation 
process, in which researchers were asked to satisfy five evaluation criteria, 
including the description of future potential applications and impacts). 
 227. See id. at 454–55. 
 228. See id. 
 229. See id. 
 230. See BODLE ET AL., supra note 21, at 20; Rayner et al., supra note 56, at 
505, 508; Winickoff & Brown, supra note 5, at 81 (“An advisory committee on 
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ence requires that overseers make decisions in the public inter-
est and free from the undue influence of researchers, research 
sponsors, and private interests.231 Accordingly, individual re-
searchers cannot be left to police themselves, and there should 
be some form of external oversight. Even peer review by other 
geoengineering researchers may not assure impartiality.232 Par-
ticipation by geoengineering experts will be necessary to enable 
informed oversight, but to ensure independence, a governing 
institution should also include diverse perspectives and inter-
ests from outside the geoengineering research community.233 
Transparency is inherent to legitimacy in the sense that 
openness demonstrates respect for the persons over whom 
democratic authority is exercised.234 Equally important, trans-
parency furthers legitimacy by exposing vested interests and 
fostering public confidence in governance processes.235 To pro-
mote transparency, the public should have detailed notice of re-
search plans in advance, as well as access to the information 
generated by research.236 Transparency also should apply to re-
search agendas: researchers and policy makers should explain 
the role of individual research projects within their broader 
context and communicate overall research goals.237 The tech-
nical nature of geoengineering demands special attention to 
presenting information to the public in an understandable 
manner.238 Perhaps most importantly, governance processes 
themselves should be transparent.239 Given the distrust that al-
ready attends geoengineering, a governance regime for 
 
geoengineering will be more effective and legitimate to the extent that it is in-
dependent, transparent, deliberative, publicly engaged, and broadly framed.”). 
 231. See Winickoff & Brown, supra note 5, at 81. 
 232. See id. (warning that an expert institution, to avoid being seen as an 
advocate for geoengineering deployment, must include people without direct 
involvement in geoengineering research). 
 233. See id.  
 234. See Neil Craik & Nigel Moore, Disclosure-Based Governance for Cli-
mate Engineering Research 4 (Ctr. for Int’l Governance Innovation, CIGI Pa-
per No. 50, 2014), https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/no.50.pdf. 
 235. See id. at 4–5; see also Winickoff & Brown, supra note 5, at 81. 
 236. See Dilling & Hauser, supra note 20, at 559 (recommending “public 
registries that include information on funding sources, personnel, research 
plans, project outcomes, etc.”). 
 237. Cf. Pidgeon et al., supra note 3, at 454 (characterizing communication 
about research as “obligatory”). 
 238. See Dilling & Hauser, supra note 20, at 556–57. 
 239. See Parson & Keith, supra note 16, at 1279; Winickoff & Brown, supra 
note 5, at 81. 
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geoengineering research will command public confidence only if 
the public can see how governance decisions are made. 
Through public participation, persons affected by a deci-
sion can have a say in its making.240 Participation can advance 
democratic governance, foster support for decisions, and gener-
ate substantively better outcomes.241 In the context of 
geoengineering governance, Dane Scott and Jane C.S. Long ar-
gue that “[p]ublic deliberation can highlight inappropriate prof-
it-making concerns, point out unbalanced scientific positions, 
call attention to hubris and institutional bias, and counter the 
influence of partisan positioning on decisionmaking.”242 Deter-
mining how to operationalize public participation presents a 
difficult matter, however, particularly when the relevant public 
consists of the entire global population. Ensuring that public 
engagement serves as more than an empty exercise presents a 
further challenge.243 Affording public access to the information 
generated by research provides a starting point;244 public com-
ment processes and deliberative exercises offer avenues for act-
ing on that information.245 The public engagement associated 
with the SPICE project provides an example of the influence 
that public input can have on decision making processes: the 
results of that engagement were delivered to a panel which in 
turn instructed the researchers to reflect on the concerns raised 
before proceeding.246  
Accountability overlaps with the values of transparency 
and participation. Transparency promotes accountability when 
those engaged in oversight explain or justify their decisions to 
the public.247 Similarly, public participation can be a means of 
holding governance institutions accountable for their deci-
sions.248 A focus on accountability highlights the importance of 
 
 240. See Rayner et al., supra note 56, at 505. 
 241. See LIN, supra note 107, at 20. 
 242. Long & Scott, supra note 150, at 51. 
 243. See Rayner et al., supra note 56, at 505. 
 244. Winickoff & Brown, supra note 5, at 81. 
 245. See Dilling & Hauser, supra note 20, at 560. 
 246. Pidgeon et al., supra note 3, at 455. 
 247. See Rayner et al., supra note 56, at 508; Rick Stapenhurst & Mitchell 
O’Brien, Accountability in Governance, WORLD BANK, http://siteresources 
.worldbank.org/PUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/Resources/ 
AccountabilityGovernance.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2016). 
 248. See Rayner et al., supra note 56, at 508; Stapenhurst & O’Brien, supra 
note 247, at 1–2 (discussing “vertical accountability[,] . . . through which citi-
zens, mass media and civil society seek to enforce standards of good perfor-
mance on officials”). 
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developing mechanisms for overseeing the overseers.249 These 
mechanisms, which may include reporting requirements, fund-
ing conditions, and formal government participation, ideally 
would ensure that geoengineering research governance is re-
sponsive to the international community, stakeholders, and the 
public.  
2. Effectiveness 
A second essential characteristic of geoengineering re-
search governance is effectiveness. Governance must effectively 
address not only the physical risks associated with individual 
field experiments, but also the systemic concerns attendant to 
geoengineering research in general. Addressing these two sets 
of issues poses formidable yet distinct challenges. The difficul-
ties of analyzing physical risks arise largely because field tests 
are inherently experimental and thus may generate unexpected 
effects. Scientists can try to reduce this uncertainty by conduct-
ing careful modeling, studying natural analogues, and gradual-
ly scaling up field experiments.250 The process of assessing 
physical risks would be a familiar one for scientists, just as the 
subsequent process of risk management would be familiar to 
policy makers. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that extant 
proposals for geoengineering research oversight focus on physi-
cal risks. 
By contrast, concerns regarding lock-in, moral hazard, and 
future military conflict differ from worries about physical risks 
in two important ways. First, these concerns are beyond the 
scope of hard scientific inquiry. Social scientists can contribute 
useful insights on these matters and offer instructive analogies, 
but can provide no ready quantitative assessments. Policy deci-
sions regarding geoengineering research will require an uneasy 
merger of qualitative analysis of these concerns with quantita-
tive risk data. Second, these concerns are systemic and cumula-
tive—they arise not so much from any individual research pro-
ject as from the overall trajectory of geoengineering research. 
Thanks to the cumulative nature of these concerns, they are 
unlikely to be given much weight in the review of single re-
 
 249. See Stapenhurst & O’Brien, supra note 247, at 1 (“[A]ccountability ex-
ists when there is a relationship where an individual or body, and the perfor-
mance of tasks or functions by that individual or body, are subject to another’s 
oversight . . . .” (emphasis omitted)). 
 250. See, e.g., KEITH, supra note 34, at 80–88 (advocating gradual ramping 
up of research and field experimentation). 
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search projects and are prone to omission from research gov-
ernance proposals. Effective consideration of systemic concerns 
will require holistic rather than piecemeal review of 
geoengineering research. 
B. DESIGN OPTIONS  
Governance can be undertaken by different actors, through 
different institutions, at different scales, and via different 
tools.251 The following discussion identifies key considerations 
in designing a governance system for geoengineering research. 
First, who should be involved in governance? The technical 
nature of geoengineering demands the involvement of scientists 
in governance, most importantly independent experts who can 
impartially evaluate research proposals and results.252 Scholars 
outside the hard sciences also can provide important contribu-
tions regarding the social and ethical implications of field ex-
periments. Yet experts alone should not decide whether or how 
geoengineering research proceeds. Humanity has a common in-
terest in a stable climate, as reflected in various calls for 
geoengineering to be regulated as a “public good.”253 Because 
decisions regarding geoengineering research will have im-
portant ramifications for public policy, democratically account-
able institutions should participate in making these decisions. 
Legitimacy further demands that potentially affected persons 
have a voice. The systemic concerns posed by even relatively 
limited field experiments make it essential to integrate the 
public into the governance process early on, rather than wait-
ing until experiments have significant physical impacts.254  
Second, through what institutions and at what scale 
should governance occur? Governance need not necessarily oc-
cur through government. Various entities could participate in 
geoengineering research governance, including professional as-
sociations and other peer-based organizations, nongovernmen-
 
 251. E.g., SOLAR RADIATION MGMT. GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, supra note 
46, at 30 (identifying different scales of regulation, ranging from individual 
regulation by researchers themselves to international regulation). 
 252. See Parson & Ernst, supra note 32, at 328. 
 253. Rayner et al., supra note 56, at 505; see also ASILOMAR SCI. ORG. 
COMM., supra note 178 (listing “[p]romoting the collective benefit of human-
kind and the environment” as the primary purpose of geoengineering re-
search). 
 254. This would be in contrast to proposals to expand participation as the 
scale of research expands. SOLAR RADIATION MGMT. GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, 
supra note 46, at 38. 
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tal organizations, national governments, and international 
treaty organizations. The scientific community’s core mecha-
nism for promoting accuracy in research is peer review. More 
generally, professional associations can ingrain values into 
members of a research or occupational community through 
codes of conduct and the like.255 These forms of governance offer 
potential advantages of flexibility and adaptability.256 But 
geoengineering research governance requires far more than the 
promotion of research accuracy or the inculcation of ethical 
practices among geoengineering researchers. Society has a 
strong interest in determining the course of geoengineering re-
search, and governance must incorporate its values and con-
cerns. One means of incorporating social values into an over-
sight regime is through the participation of nongovernmental 
organizations, such as certification societies or nonprofit envi-
ronmental monitors.257 However, absent government sanction—
and perhaps even in its presence—such governance may not be 
perceived as representative or legitimate.258 Governance 
through national governments or international treaty organiza-
tions is more likely to offer the legitimacy essential to 
geoengineering research. International oversight requires a 
level of cooperation that national oversight does not. Climate 
change is a problem of the global commons, however, and the 
global implications of geoengineering research call for repre-
sentation of those whom geoengineering would affect. There is 
a further, practical argument for international oversight or in-
ternational coordination of oversight: research restrictions may 
have limited effect unless they extend beyond national bounda-
 
 255. See LIN, supra note 107, at 167; Lorna Weir & Michael J. Selgelid, 
Professionalization as a Governance Strategy for Synthetic Biology, 3 SYSTEMS 
& SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 91, 94 (2009). 
 256. Marchant & Pope, supra note 45, at 389. 
 257. See Cathy C. Conrad & Krista G. Hilchey, A Review of Citizen Science 
and Community-Based Environmental Monitoring: Issues and Opportunities, 
176 ENVTL. MONITORING & ASSESSMENT 273, 276–78 (2011) (discussing dif-
ferent forms of community-based monitoring); Ewald Rametsteiner & Markku 
Simula, Forest Certification—an Instrument To Promote Sustainable Forest 
Management?, 67 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 87, 89–90 (2003) (discussing implementa-
tion of forest certification schemes). 
 258. See, e.g., Benjamin Cashore et al., Forest Certification (Eco-Labeling) 
Programs and Their Policy-Making Authority: Explaining Divergence Among 
North American and European Case Studies, 5 FOREST POL’Y & ECON. 225, 
228–37 (2003) (discussing various forest certification schemes and their per-
ceived legitimacy). 
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ries.259 Ultimately, broad, multilateral participation in an in-
ternational governance regime can foster its reach and legiti-
macy,260 though the involvement of large numbers of countries 
may diminish its effectiveness.261 
International governance could take place through a single 
institution, but the breadth of potential geoengineering activi-
ties makes it more likely that a complex of multiple institutions 
would jointly govern the subject.262 One observer has described 
the current state of international geoengineering governance, 
including actions taken under the CBD and LC/LP treaty re-
gimes to address geoengineering research, as an “emerging in-
stitutional complex.”263 These institutions eventually may 
merge into a single regime in which one institution dominates 
and sets a general policy direction.264 Or they may evolve inde-
pendently and continue to act without any coordination.265 A 
single institution that takes the lead in geoengineering govern-
ance could fulfill various functions.266 Most importantly, such 
an institution would be situated to take a broad, programmatic 
view of all geoengineering research and to do so in the context 
of other options for responding to climate change. It might also 
develop overarching principles and coordinate arrangements by 
other institutions.267 The involvement of multiple institutions 
can offer benefits of expertise and specialization.268 In addition, 
combining the efforts of a broad institution with more special-
ized institutions can avoid burdening policy makers with the 
minutiae of implementing a complex oversight regime.269 Such a 
 
 259. See Singer, supra note 45, at 227–28 (contending that national deci-
sions not to research a subject “will not stop the knowledge emerging some-
where in the world”); cf. Marchant & Pope, supra note 45, at 381 (remarking 
that international regulation might in principle prevent off-shoring of research 
but is difficult to accomplish in practice). 
 260. BODLE ET AL., supra note 21, at 124. 
 261. Bodansky, supra note 21, at 544. 
 262. See BODLE ET AL., supra note 21, at 132. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 133. 
 265. See id. 
 266. Id. at 156–57. 
 267. Id. 
 268. See Bodansky, supra note 21, at 545 (suggesting “a broadly-inclusive 
international institution . . . for the development of general rules regarding 
geoengineering” but “a smaller group with technical expertise” or national de-
cision-makers for applying such rules). 
 269. See id. at 544–45. 
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differentiated approach may suit the oversight of research into 
widely varying geoengineering techniques.  
A third design question turns to the choice of specific tools 
of governance. Tools of governance can include formal “hard” 
regulation as well as “soft” governance processes.270 Formal 
regulation includes prohibitions, restrictions, permitting sys-
tems, and notification and disclosure requirements.271 Hard law 
obligations flow from recognized lawmaking processes and are 
generally binding.272 Soft governance processes refer to other, 
nonbinding means of influencing activity, such as the estab-
lishment of guidelines, recommendations, or norms, as well as 
funding allocation decisions.273  
To date, efforts to govern geoengineering research have 
primarily involved soft law. For example, decisions by govern-
ments to fund—or not to fund—geoengineering research have 
had a direct effect on research levels and have sent implicit 
messages regarding the acceptability of such research. Gov-
ernment funding decisions cannot carry out the full range of 
desired governance functions, however, nor do they directly 
control research funded by private parties. Soft governance ef-
forts have also included bottom-up efforts to develop voluntary 
guidelines.274 Although such efforts can be a relatively simple 
and flexible means of establishing norms, they have produced 
only “consensus statements . . . lacking the specificity needed to 
help any body—governmental or scientific—enact operational 
governance and assessment procedures” with respect to 
geoengineering research.275 Indeed, the best known guidelines, 
the Oxford Principles, are described by their own authors as 
“high-level and abstract,” “intended . . . to be interpreted and 
implemented in different ways, appropriate to the technology 
under consideration and the stage of its development, as well 
as the wider social context of the research.”276 
 
 270. SOLAR RADIATION MGMT. GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, supra note 46, at 
29. 
 271. See BODLE ET AL., supra note 21, at 131–32. 
 272. See DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL EN-
VIRONMENTAL LAW 13–14 (2010). 
 273. See SOLAR RADIATION MGMT. GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, supra note 46, 
at 29; Bodansky, supra note 21, at 544. 
 274. E.g., SOLAR RADIATION MGMT. GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, supra note 
46, at 36; see also BODLE ET AL., supra note 21, at 124 (discussing such efforts). 
 275. Parson & Keith, supra note 16. 
 276. Rayner et al., supra note 56, at 504. 
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C. PUTTING TOGETHER THE MISSING PIECES 
Governance of geoengineering research should address 
physical risks as well as systemic concerns. Because the exist-
ing literature already suggests various options for addressing 
physical risks,277 the discussion below focuses on addressing 
systemic concerns. A governance regime might mitigate sys-
temic risks through a variety of mechanisms, but should in-
clude several key elements. These elements are: programmatic 
technology assessment, analysis of the systemic risks posed by 
specific geoengineering techniques, prioritization of research 
into techniques involving lesser systemic risks, and institution 
of safeguards against systemic risks. 
1. Ongoing Programmatic Technology Assessment 
a. General Design Issues 
A developing consensus in the scientific community sup-
ports external review of geoengineering field research.278 The 
oversight typically contemplated would involve project-by-
project review to identify a particular experiment’s physical 
risks and to provide an opportunity for public input. Such re-
view is essential, but unlikely to account adequately for the 
cumulative effects of multiple research projects. More im-
portantly, project-by-project review would miss the systemic 
concerns of geoengineering research—lock-in, moral hazard, 
and increased potential for conflict.  
These shortcomings resemble a common flaw encountered 
in National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analysis: envi-
ronmental impact statements (EISs) for individual projects of-
ten overlook indirect, cumulative, or programmatic effects. 
NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare an EIS for major 
federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment.279 Programmatic EISs offer one means of articu-
lating and analyzing effects that extend beyond individual pro-
jects.280 In contrast to piecemeal, project-specific assessments, 
 
 277. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 278. Parson & Ernst, supra note 32, at 320, 324 (suggesting that one 
“point[] of strong consensus” is that “research itself needs governance”); see 
also Editorial, A Charter for Geoengineering, 485 NATURE 415, 415 (2012) 
(calling for regulation before geoengineering field experiments begin). 
 279. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012). 
 280. See Jon C. Cooper, Broad Programmatic, Policy and Planning Assess-
ments Under the National Environmental Policy Act and Similar Devices: A 
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programmatic analyses evaluate the environmental impacts of 
multiple facilities, multiple projects, or agency-wide policies or 
programs. These analyses consequently can identify and re-
solve difficult but important issues that might otherwise be 
avoided.281 Programmatic EISs can be substantial undertak-
ings, however, and judicial interpretations of NEPA require 
their preparation only in fairly narrow circumstances.282 Not 
surprisingly, in analyzing similar but unrelated research pro-
jects, federal agencies often dodge the consideration of broader 
systemic concerns.283  
The proposal here moves beyond NEPA’s requirements and 
urges an ongoing programmatic technology assessment of 
geoengineering research activities. This assessment would con-
sider the cumulative effects of multiple research projects, ex-
amine the developmental trajectory of specific techniques in 
light of ongoing research, and tease out scientific, social, and 
ethical issues.284 As explained in more detail below, the pro-
posed analysis would differ from conventional NEPA analysis 
in several ways. First, it would consider the effects of all 
geoengineering research activities and do so within the context 
of other strategies for responding to climate change. Analysis 
 
Quiet Revolution in an Approach to Environmental Considerations, 11 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 89, 94, 133–34 (1993). 
 281. See id. at 116 (“[A] programmatic/policy assessment is an attempt by 
high-level officials to examine the implications of the programs/policies from 
top to bottom.”); id. at 136. 
 282. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 405–06 (1976) (holding that 
preparation of studies of possible resource development does not trigger obli-
gation to prepare an EIS absent a specific proposal); Nat. Res. Def. Council v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Navy, No. CV-01-07781 CAS (RZX), 2002 WL 32095131, at *13–
17 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2002) (rejecting claim that Navy tests of anti-
submarine technologies required programmatic NEPA review). 
 283. See Found. on Econ. Trends v. Lyng, 817 F.2d 882, 884–85 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (finding no programmatic EIS required for “diverse” and “discrete” ani-
mal productivity research projects); Found. on Econ. Trends v. Heckler, 756 
F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (vacating lower court injunction of GMO deliberate 
release experiments in absence of programmatic EIS); Cooper, supra note 280, 
at 117–18 (discussing agencies’ wide discretion in deciding whether to prepare 
programmatic EISs and their opposition to doing so). No law bars agencies 
from conducting programmatic EISs to analyze systemic concerns, and NEPA 
regulations encourage the preparation of EISs for research programs for new 
technologies. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4(c)(3) (2015) (“[A]gencies may find it useful 
to evaluate the proposal(s) . . . [b]y stage of technological development includ-
ing federal or federally assisted research, development or demonstration pro-
grams for new technologies . . . .”). 
 284. Cf. Rayner et al., supra note 56, at 507 (urging “[r]egular assessments 
of the impacts of geoengineering research” to address the environmental and 
socioeconomic impacts of research).  
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should encompass social and systemic effects in addition to 
physical effects. Second, the tools of analysis would include not 
only environmental impact analysis, but also scenario plan-
ning, vision assessment, and other future-oriented analyses. 
Third, the analytical process would be ongoing rather than dis-
crete. 
The proposed geoengineering technology assessment would 
extend more broadly than ordinary NEPA analysis. It would 
consider all geoengineering research activities, regardless of 
federal funding, approval, or involvement. Ideally, this analysis 
would account for research activities both inside and outside 
the United States. Such a broad-ranging analysis is feasible. 
While some research might occur beyond public scrutiny, most 
geoengineering researchers believe that transparency is essen-
tial and are willing to make public their experiments and re-
sults.285 Furthermore, the proposed assessment would give close 
attention to the policy context of geoengineering research. 
Agencies often limit the range of alternatives in NEPA anal-
yses to fit their narrowly defined needs.286 The assessment of 
geoengineering alternatives, in contrast, should be part of a 
broader discussion concerning the full range of climate change 
policy options.287 Equally important, the analysis should extend 
beyond technical design issues and safety and environmental 
concerns to consider social, economic, and other relevant ef-
fects.288 A comprehensive approach is necessary to assess lock-
 
 285. See Dilling & Hauser, supra note 20, at 559 (noting that transparency 
“has repeatedly come up as a necessary component of a geoengineering gov-
ernance framework”); Morgan et al., supra note 51 (recommending “guidelines 
to provide open access to SRM knowledge”); see also BPC, supra note 52, at 14 
(affirming importance of transparency); ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 28, at 52 
(“Research activity should be as open . . . as possible . . . .”). 
 286. See James Allen, NEPA Alternatives Analysis: The Evolving Exclusion 
of Remote and Speculative Alternatives, 25 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 
287, 300–09 (2005) (discussing case law); cf. City of Alexandria v. Slater, 198 
F.3d 862, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (reviewing agency’s objectives and agency’s 
evaluation of alternatives in light of these objectives “with considerable defer-
ence to the agency’s expertise and policy-making role”). 
 287. Cf. Rob Bellamy et al., “Opening Up” Geoengineering Appraisal: Multi-
Criteria Mapping of Options for Tackling Climate Change, 23 GLOBAL ENVTL. 
CHANGE 926, 927 (2013) (contending that the failure of existing 
geoengineering appraisals to reflect mitigation and adaptation alternatives for 
responding to climate change has “closed down” debate and can lead to prema-
ture lock-in). 
 288. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012); Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People 
Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 774 (1983) (holding that agencies must 
consider only those effects where there is “a reasonably close causal relation-
ship between a change in the physical environment and the effect at issue”). 
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in, moral hazard, and other systemic effects, and to consider so-
cial acceptability as well as technical readiness. Indeed, the as-
sessment process itself, if done in a careful and open manner, 
may mitigate these systemic concerns by identifying the limita-
tions and flaws of geoengineering techniques. 
The proposed assessment would identify trends and future 
technological developments, yet should endeavor to do more 
than predict the future. Another important function would be 
to envision possible future scenarios and stimulate public dis-
course regarding those scenarios. Accordingly, the assessment 
process should incorporate analytical techniques in addition to 
the risk analyses and impact assessments that typically domi-
nate EISs. Scenario planning, vision assessment, and other in-
novative techniques would also be useful. In scenario planning, 
participants develop narratives that identify important deci-
sions, events, and consequences of plausible future scenarios.289 
Policy makers can use these scenarios to conduct more effective 
strategic planning in the face of uncertainty.290 These scenarios 
also can serve as the subject of public engagement exercises 
and thereby facilitate discussions about societal goals. Another 
technique, vision assessment, evaluates far-reaching yet plau-
sible technological visions articulated by scientists and others. 
This analysis can provide strategic knowledge for bringing 
about—or preventing—such visions and shaping public debate 
about future technologies.291  
Researchers are beginning to explore how these futuring 
techniques may inform geoengineering policy. A recent scenar-
 
 289. See JAMES A. OGILVY, CREATING BETTER FUTURES: SCENARIO PLAN-
NING AS A TOOL FOR A BETTER TOMORROW 175–76 (2002); David N. Bengston, 
Futures Research: A Neglected Dimension in Environmental Policy and Plan-
ning, in ENVIRONMENTAL FUTURES RESEARCH: EXPERIENCES, APPROACHES, 
AND OPPORTUNITIES 4, 8 (2012). A recent scenario planning exercise focused 
on SRM. See GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FUTURES, HUMAN INTERVENTION IN THE 
EARTH’S CLIMATE: THE GOVERNANCE OF GEOENGINEERING IN 2025+ (2015). 
 290. See Bengston, supra note 289; Stephen R. Carpenter & Adena R. 
Rissman, Scenarios and Decisionmaking for Complex Environmental Systems, 
in ENVIRONMENTAL FUTURES RESEARCH, supra note 289, at 37–38 (noting 
that scenario planning helps policy makers deal with “profound uncertainty”); 
cf. OGILVY, supra note 289, at 176–77 (noting that scenario planning fosters 
“bottom-up innovation and creativity”). 
 291. See Armin Grunwald, Vision Assessment as a New Element of the FTA 
Toolbox, EU-US SEMINAR: NEW TECHNOLOGY FORESIGHT, FORECASTING & 
ASSESSMENT METHODS 53, 56–60 (2004), http://foresight.jrc.ec.europa.eu/fta/ 
papers/Session%204%20What's%20the%20Use/Vision%20Assessment%20as% 
20a%20new%20element%20of%20the%20FTA%20toolbox.pdf (explaining the 
role of visions and vision assessment in technology). 
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io-planning exercise concerning solar radiation management, 
for example, generated six scenarios premised on differing lev-
els of stakeholder self-interest and technological controllabil-
ity.292 The conveners of the exercise suggested that the scenari-
os offer “insight into some of the dynamics that may shape how 
our world unfolds” and could assist in evaluating proposals for 
SRM governance across varying conditions.293 
Any programmatic assessment of geoengineering should 
incorporate broad and meaningful public engagement.294 At a 
minimum, such engagement would raise public understanding 
of geoengineering and its limitations. Public hearings, delibera-
tive exercises, and the like would not only provide information, 
but also encourage input, identify concerns, and stimulate de-
bate. Without adequate public engagement, future 
geoengineering field experiments are likely to encounter oppo-
sition akin to that provoked by the SPICE experiment. Public 
engagement, in other words, can help establish the social li-
cense for field research and legitimize research governance.  
Generating effective public engagement may not be easy. 
Technical descriptions of geoengineering proposals could ex-
clude lay citizens from meaningful participation. Speculative 
accounts of relatively untested techniques could lead to unpro-
ductive discussions or irrational responses. In addition, the 
broad and general scope of a programmatic assessment may 
limit interest in participation. Assessments of specific proposed 
field experiments, in contrast, might stimulate immediate con-
cern and more intense interest. Relatedly, geoengineering and 
climate change present long-term issues that must compete for 
attention with seemingly more urgent matters. The public reac-
tions to the SPICE and Haida experiments nevertheless sug-
gest that geoengineering’s controversial nature will generate 
keen interest. Creative methods of outreach and attention from 
policy makers and opinion leaders may be necessary. 
It is worth noting that public engagement is unlikely to 
lead to social consensus. Participatory processes often yield 
 
 292. See YALE CLIMATE & ENERGY INST., SCENARIO PLANNING FOR SOLAR 
RADIATION MANAGEMENT 8 (2013). 
 293. Id. at 26. A prominent issue raised in discussions of the scenarios was 
the slippery slope concern that technologies, once developed, tend to be used. 
Id. at 6. 
 294. See Winickoff & Brown, supra note 5, at 82 (also suggesting the publi-
cation of accessible reports and outreach to mass media outlets). 
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more questions than answers.295 In the case of geoengineering, 
reconciling opposing views may be especially difficult because 
controversies touch on deeply-held values regarding humanity’s 
capabilities and limitations and humanity’s proper relationship 
to nature.296 Rather than seeking to produce consensus, partici-
patory processes ideally would “explor[e] systematic divergenc-
es of perspective” and provide insights to inform policy making 
on geoengineering and geoengineering research.297  
b. Mechanics 
When should a programmatic geoengineering technology 
assessment begin, and who should conduct it? The systemic 
concerns raised by geoengineering research argue for commenc-
ing the proposed assessment before further field experimenta-
tion gets underway. Putting in place an assessment process 
would provide some assurance that independent oversight of 
field research is taking place. Early assessment and public dis-
cussion would ease worries that the science is proceeding faster 
than society can control it and counter the danger of technolog-
ical lock-in. Preferably, the assessment process would be ongo-
ing or recurring rather than a one-time event. Ongoing analysis 
would enable consideration of new developments in 
geoengineering research, climate change science, and global 
events. Such a process also would facilitate a deepening under-
standing of geoengineering, promote continuing societal delib-
eration, and encourage the consideration of exit strategies 
should a once-promising technique prove to be problematic.298 
 
 295. See Andy Stirling, “Opening Up” and “Closing Down”: Power, Partici-
pation, and Pluralism in the Social Appraisal of Technology, 33 SCI. TECH. & 
HUM. VALUES 262, 282 (2008) (noting that participatory appraisals of technol-
ogy may not lead to “final consensus”). 
 296. See Adam Corner et al., Messing with Nature? Exploring Public Per-
ceptions of Geoengineering in the UK, 23 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 938, 942 
(2013) (noting that the theme of “messing with nature” stood out in public de-
liberative workshops involving the public on geoengineering); Dan M. Kahan 
et al., Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-
Channel Model of Science Communication, 685 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POLIT. & 
SOC. SCI. 192, 193 (2014) (noting that “cultural meanings influence public per-
ceptions” of geoengineering risk); Rayner, supra note 213, at 12–13 (noting 
that geoengineering implicates “what it means to be human and our relation-
ship with nature”).  
 297. Stirling, supra note 295. 
 298. Cf. Walker, supra note 187, at 844–45 (discussing importance of con-
sidering exit strategies as a defense to lock-in). 
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In the United States, the federal government is the entity 
best situated to undertake the proposed assessment. The feder-
al government has financial, technical, and other resources to 
support an assessment and could offer a more objective ap-
proach than private parties. Furthermore, the federal govern-
ment has the general authority and means to act on the result-
ing information and recommendations. As a significant source 
of research funding, it can create and enforce conditions on 
geoengineering research grants. 
Effectiveness and trust are important criteria in identify-
ing a specific federal actor to carry out the assessment. Logical 
candidates include the Environmental Protection Agency, 
which has expertise in analyzing health and environmental 
consequences, and the Government Accountability Office, 
which has performed an increasing number of technology as-
sessments in recent years.299 Both agencies have experience in 
carrying out assessments, though on a smaller scale and a more 
discrete basis than envisioned here. Although the work of these 
agencies is increasingly subject to politicization and partisan 
attack, their involvement may be preferable to creating a new 
agency to carry out the assessment. An agency focused on 
geoengineering—whose existence may be contingent on contin-
ued research and eventual deployment300—may be more vul-
nerable to bias. 
Regardless of the agency tasked with preparing the as-
sessment, an important complementary role could be played by 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or a government advi-
sory committee composed of experts, representatives of poten-
tially affected communities, and representatives of diverse po-
litical viewpoints.301 NGOs such as World Wide Views could 
carry out citizen consultations and other participatory exercises 
to engage the public and explore public views on a global 
scale.302 Furthermore, a government advisory committee could 
offer greater independence and flexibility than established gov-
 
 299. See LIN, supra note 107, at 25. One of the GAO’s assessments con-
cerned geoengineering and included a technical assessment of specific tech-
niques, consultation with experts, and a public survey. GOV’T ACCOUNTABIL-
ITY OFFICE, supra note 52. 
 300. See Long & Scott, supra note 150, at 51 (noting that geoengineering 
faces hurdles to research and deployment). 
 301. See Winickoff & Brown, supra note 5, at 81. 
 302. See Bjørn Bedsted et al., The Story of WWViews, in CITIZEN PARTICI-
PATION IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 30 (Mikko Rask et al. eds., 
2012); WORLD WIDE VIEWS, http://wwviews.org (last visited Apr. 16, 2016). 
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ernment agencies and could provide advice on an oversight 
framework.303 While such a committee could be a valuable 
source of input in structuring a programmatic assessment or 
project-specific oversight, a government agency should retain 
the responsibility for carrying out the assessment and engage-
ment functions. 
The proposed technology assessment would move beyond 
current ad hoc efforts to manage geoengineering research. The-
se efforts include formal legal mechanisms (such as the 
amendment to the London Protocol), soft law mechanisms (such 
as the Oxford Principles), information gathering initiatives 
(such as prior reports prepared by the GAO), and outreach ef-
forts (such as the SRMGI). None of these efforts purport to as-
sess, let alone comprehensively govern, geoengineering field re-
search. Nor do extant efforts offer a broad forum for public 
input and engagement. A programmatic geoengineering tech-
nology assessment would make significant advances in these 
regards. 
The proposed assessment nonetheless can build on existing 
efforts, such as the Integrated Assessment of Geoengineering 
Proposals (IAGP). The IAGP is a four-year multidisciplinary 
research project funded by British research agencies and car-
ried out by several institutions.304 The IAGP’s “core research ob-
jectives” include evaluating the effectiveness and side-effects of 
geoengineering proposals and assessing the controllability of 
global climate using these proposals.305 The IAGP emphasizes 
technical evaluation and arguably neglects the systemic con-
cerns of geoengineering research. Nonetheless, researchers as-
 
 303. Winickoff & Brown, supra note 5, at 83; see also Long & Scott, supra 
note 150 (discussing possible functions of an independent geoengineering ad-
visory board). 
 304. Who We Are, INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF GEOENGINEERING PRO-
POSALS, http://www.iagp.ac.uk/who-we-are.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2016) 
[hereinafter IAGP]; see also KAREN PARKHILL & NICK PIDGEON, PUBLIC EN-
GAGEMENT ON GEOENGINEERING RESEARCH: PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE 
SPICE DELIBERATIVE WORKSHOPS 4 (2011) (detailing the history and aims of 
the IAGP).  
 305. See IAGP, supra note 304. The IAGP’s central tasks include 
developing a framework for assessing the viability of various techniques and 
engaging various stakeholders and the public. See Developing a Framework for 
the Evaluation of Geoengineering Proposals, INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF 
GEOENGINEERING PROPOSALS, http://www.iagp.ac.uk/1-developing-framework 
-evaluation-geoengineering-proposals.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2016); Engag-
ing with Member of the Public and Other Stakeholders, INTEGRATED ASSESS-
MENT OF GEOENGINEERING PROPOSALS, http://www.iagp.ac.uk/2-engaging 
-member-public-and-other-stakeholders (last visited Apr. 16, 2016). 
  
2564 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:2509 
 
sociated with the IAGP have undertaken several projects that 
are consistent with the programmatic assessment proposed 
here, such as a broadly-based appraisal of geoengineering op-
tions by two dozen specialists,306 a similar appraisal by thirteen 
citizens,307 and public discussion groups of climate change and 
geoengineering.308 
Finally, although the proposal here is for the U.S. govern-
ment to initiate the proposed assessment, it need not—and 
should not—have exclusive control over geoengineering re-
search assessment. Rather, geoengineering is an issue that 
demands international participation in an ongoing global con-
versation. Other governments could undertake similar assess-
ments on their own, participate in a U.S.-led assessment, or re-
spond to specific issues raised by a U.S. assessment. The Kyiv 
Protocol to the Espoo Convention, which some twenty-six Euro-
pean nations have joined, requires parties to conduct a strate-
gic environmental assessment of plans and programs likely to 
have significant environmental effects.309 Such an assessment 
process could offer a framework for conducting the program-
matic technology assessment suggested here. 
Nor should any programmatic assessment serve as an end-
point for governance efforts. Ideally, a programmatic assess-
ment would serve as a springboard for further analysis, debate, 
and policy making on geoengineering research. Perhaps most 
obviously, the programmatic assessment should inform the es-
tablishment of an oversight regime for individual field trials. 
Such oversight, which can build on existing governance efforts 
under the CBD and LC/LP as well as research governance pro-
 
 306. See Bellamy et al., supra note 287, at 928. 
 307. See Rob Bellamy et al., Deliberative Mapping of Options for Tackling 
Climate Change: Citizens and Specialists “Open Up” Appraisal of 
Geoengineering, PUB. UNDERSTANDING OF SCI., 2014, at 1, 5, http://pus 
.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/09/12/0963662514548628.full.pdf. 
 308. See Corner et al., supra note 296, at 938. 
 309. Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment to the Convention on 
Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, May 21, 
2003, U.N. Doc. ECE/MP.EIA/2003/2, http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/ 
env/eia/documents/legaltexts/protocolenglish.pdf. The Protocol has thirty-eight 
signatories as of April 16, 2016. Status of Protocol on Strategic Environmental 
Assessment to the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a 
Transboundary Context, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://  
treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-4-b& 
chapter=27&lang=en (last visited Apr. 16, 2016). 
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posals in the literature,310 would focus on the physical risks as-
sociated with individual experiments. 
2. Analyze Dangers and Set Research Priorities 
The proposed assessment would analyze both the physical 
hazards and systemic dangers of prospective geoengineering 
techniques. In contrast to conventional assessments of physical 
risk, the assessment of systemic dangers would be a somewhat 
novel undertaking. For illustrative purposes, this section con-
siders how the proposed assessment might identify techniques 
posing a greater danger of lock-in.  
From studying technologies such as nuclear power, com-
mentators have identified various technical and organizational 
indicators of technological inflexibility.311 Technical indicators 
of inflexibility pertain to the inherent features of a technique, 
whereas organizational indicators pertain to how a technology 
is likely to be framed and developed.312 Technical indicators of 
inflexibility include high capital intensity, long lead times from 
idea to application, large-scale production units, substantial in-
frastructure requirements, and irreversibility.313 Such charac-
teristics lead to inflexibility because they generally call for 
large upfront commitments of effort, funding, political capital, 
or other resources. Once made, these commitments can be polit-
ically and psychologically difficult to undo. The momentum be-
hind inflexible technologies derives not only from their scale 
but also from their tendency to create powerful constituencies 
and institutions having a vested interest in perpetuating or ex-
panding existing commitments.  
Organizational indicators of inflexibility arise from the in-
stitutional and social contexts surrounding a technology rather 
than from the technology itself. These indicators include hype, 
hubris, closure to criticism, and operation through organiza-
tions having a single mission.314 Such features foster lock-in by 
 
 310. See supra Parts I.B, II.A.1. 
 311. See Shackley & Thompson, supra note 190, at 115 (characterizing 
conventional nuclear power as “relatively inflexible” and renewable power as 
“relatively flexible”). 
 312. See id. at 112, 115. 
 313. See DAVID COLLINGRIDGE, THE MANAGEMENT OF SCALE: BIG ORGANI-
ZATIONS, BIG DECISIONS, BIG MISTAKES 14 (1992); ROYAL COMM’N ON ENVTL. 
POLLUTION, NOVEL MATERIALS IN THE ENVIRONMENT: THE CASE OF NANO-
TECHNOLOGY 8 (2008); Cairns, supra note 182, at 655; Shackley & Thompson, 
supra note 190, at 112. 
 314. See Shackley & Thompson, supra note 190, at 115. 
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suppressing critical inquiry, fashioning social expectations, and 
diminishing the possibility of changing course.315 Although or-
ganizational indicators of inflexibility are not inherent to spe-
cific technologies, they often accompany technologies that have 
features of technical inflexibility. For example, the nuclear in-
dustry, which runs large-scale, capital-intensive facilities, his-
torically has resisted critical scrutiny and operated through 
single-mission companies or organizations.316 
How might the factors of technical and organizational in-
flexibility apply to various geoengineering proposals? A thor-
ough analysis is beyond the scope of this Article, but several 
preliminary observations can be made. All geoengineering 
techniques are far from effective application and would require 
substantial effort and resources to ready them for deploy-
ment.317 The long lead time to deployment indicates that each 
technique is at some risk of lock-in if field experimentation pro-
ceeds.318 Other indicators of inflexibility nonetheless suggest a 
higher risk of lock-in for some techniques than others. SRM 
techniques, which have attracted some support because of their 
potential to provide cheap and rapid cooling,319 have been the 
focus of governance concerns because of the physical risks and 
 
 315. See id.  
 316. See id. at 113–14 tbl.1 (presenting the flexibility characteristics of the 
nuclear industry in tabular form). 
 317. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 52, at v–vi; see also 
Gordon MacKerron, Costs and Economics of Geoengineering 12 (Climate 
Geoengineering Governance Working Paper Series, Paper No. 13, 2014), http:// 
geoengineering-governance-research.org/perch/resources/workingpaper13 
mackerroncostsandeconomicsofgeoengineering.pdf (noting that for all 
geoengineering options, “the state of technological development is exceptional-
ly limited, and in most cases does not yet extend to any kind of even small-
scale demonstration”). 
 318. See Bellamy et al., supra note 198, at 611 (noting that geoengineering 
proposals, “[a]s an upstream suite of technology proposals . . . are particularly 
sensitive to . . . instrumental framing conditions and could easily be quickly 
and prematurely closed down, locking us in to certain technological trajecto-
ries but not others”). 
 319. See Parson & Ernst, supra note 32, at 314 (describing the SRM tech-
niques that “offer extremely high leverage” as “fast, cheap, and imperfect”). 
The cost of delivering aerosols with specially designed aircraft has been esti-
mated to be in the range of $10 billion to $25 billion, a small fraction of global 
GDP. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 52, at 31 tbl.3.2 (report-
ing estimated first-year cost of $35 billion to $65 billion and subsequent annu-
al costs of $13 billion to $25 billion); Morgan et al., supra note 51, at 40 (re-
porting $10 billion estimate); Robock, supra note 59, at 166 (discussing various 
quantitative cost estimates). 
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international conflict they might cause.320 SRM techniques also 
warrant careful scrutiny because their implementation would 
require sizable economic, social, and political commitments 
over extended periods of time.321 
To take an example, consider stratospheric aerosol release. 
This often-cited SRM technique possesses several indicators of 
inflexibility. First, it faces a long lead time: a leading proponent 
estimates a deployable stratospheric aerosol system to be at 
least two decades away.322 Second, significant hype surrounds 
the technique: popular accounts sometimes characterize it as a 
“cheap and simple solution[]” to a “straightforward engineering 
problem.”323 The cost estimates on which such statements rest 
are probably low, however. These estimates typically quantify 
only direct costs, omitting external costs to society or the envi-
ronment.324 Furthermore, optimism bias, structural incentives, 
and the need for unanticipated design changes consistently 
lead to underestimates of the costs of novel, large-scale tech-
nologies.325 A third indicator of inflexibility is the substantial 
capital and infrastructure that stratospheric aerosol deploy-
ment would require. If aircraft are used, for example, a dedi-
cated fleet of specialized planes would have to make hundreds 
or thousands of flights per day over perhaps hundreds of 
years.326 Deployment of the technique would likely create pow-
 
 320. See, e.g., SOLAR RADIATION MGMT. GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, supra 
note 46 (analyzing the physical and political risks of SRM); Morgan et al., su-
pra note 51 (recommending development and implementation of a voluntary 
code for SRM research).  
 321. The use of space-based solar deflectors, for example, would involve the 
deployment of trillions of reflecting discs or tens of thousands of large mirrors. 
See ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 28, at 32. 
 322. See KEITH, supra note 34, at 88; see also GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OF-
FICE, supra note 52, at 33 (rating stratospheric aerosol technology as very im-
mature “because only basic principles have been reported”). 
 323. STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, SUPERFREAKONOMICS 193–
94 (2009). Professor Scott Barrett similarly lauds its “incredible economics.” 
Scott Barrett, The Incredible Economics of Geoengineering, 39 ENVTL. & RE-
SOURCE ECON. 45 (2008); see also Alan Carlin, Global Climate Change Control: 
Is There a Better Strategy Than Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions?, 155 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1401, 1459–60 (2007). 
 324. See MacKerron, supra note 317, at 4. Indeed, MacKerron contends 
that the direct cost estimates of stratospheric aerosol release found in the lit-
erature “are simple to the point of being simplistic” and “generally far from 
contemporary good practice.” Id. at 5. 
 325. See id. at 7–9, 12.  
 326. See Alan Robock et al., Benefits, Risks, and Costs of Stratospheric 
Geoengineering, GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS, Oct. 2, 2009, at 1, 2–7 (discuss-
ing possible methods of delivering aerosols to the stratosphere); R. Turco, 
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erful economic constituencies and necessitate a centralized 
structure designed to ensure its smooth and unhindered opera-
tion.327 One final indicator of technology inflexibility for strato-
spheric aerosol release is its irreversibility, which would be 
two-fold. For one, it would be virtually impossible to recover re-
leased particles, which would be problematic if they turned out 
to be harmful.328 Sulfur species are already present in the at-
mosphere in large quantities and pose relatively well-
understood risks, but specially engineered aerosols could give 
rise to new or uncertain hazards. For another, it would be quite 
difficult to reverse any SRM scheme, including stratospheric 
aerosol release, once it is fully deployed.329 This latter difficul-
ty—often referred to as the “termination problem”—arises from 
the fact that the sudden cessation of SRM would result in an 
extremely rapid rebound to ungeoengineered conditions.330 Hu-
man societies and natural ecosystems would have little time to 
adapt to such a swift change in climate.  
Further analyses of individual geoengineering techniques 
would identify techniques less susceptible to lock-in. Analyses 
also would consider the extent to which techniques may pose a 
moral hazard or heighten the risks of military conflict. A realis-
tic and accessible assessment could itself counter moral hazard 
if it underscores the need to mitigate. And at the least, it could 
identify those techniques less likely to be misperceived as a 
magic bullet against climate change.331 
 
Geoengineering the Stratospheric Sulfate Layer from Aircraft Platforms: 
Scale, Engineering Constraints, and Estimated Costs 5 (Sept. 2009) (un-
published manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota Law Review); see also 
MacKerron, supra note 317, at 21 (suggesting that geoengineering technolo-
gies are large-scale in that they potentially involve multi-national or global 
efforts). 
 327. See Szerszynski et al., supra note 43, at 2812, 2814. 
 328. Cf. ROYAL COMM’N ON ENVTL. POLLUTION, supra note 313 (suggesting 
the widespread and uncontrolled release of substances into the environment 
as an indicator of technological inflexibility). 
 329. Relatedly, the inability to opt out of any global SRM scheme suggests 
the potentially “anti-democratic constitution of the technology and its incom-
patibility with liberal democracy.” Macnaghten & Szerszynski, supra note 219. 
 330. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 63–65; H. Damon 
Matthews & Ken Caldeira, Transient Climate-Carbon Simulations of Plane-
tary Geoengineering, 104 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 9949, 9951–52 (2007) 
(describing how temperatures, previously suppressed by aerosols, would quick-
ly rebound to the levels they would have reached had no geoengineering been 
implemented). 
 331. See Lin, supra note 204, at 708. 
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Ultimately, research priority setting and resource alloca-
tion decisions should take these analyses into account. Result-
ing policies might resemble the “soft geoengineering” approach 
described by technology scholar Robert Olson. Cautioning 
against categorical rejection of geoengineering, Olson advocates 
prioritizing the development of techniques that “touch gently 
on biological and social systems.”332 Such techniques, he sug-
gests, can be applied locally yet also be scaled up or rapidly re-
versed. In addition, these techniques ideally would offer multi-
ple benefits, cause minimal negative impacts, resemble natural 
processes, and be cost-effective.333 Among the techniques that 
fare well under Olson’s criteria are the creation of microbubbles 
on water body surfaces to increase their reflectivity and the 
placement of light-colored material on ice to slow melting pro-
cesses.334 Such techniques might also do well in an analysis of 
systemic concerns: they appear to pose little risk of lock-in or of 
undermining mitigation efforts and are not obviously suscepti-
ble to military application.335 
Using the information generated by a programmatic tech-
nology assessment, governments should set research priorities 
that reflect the public interest. Notwithstanding generally 
prevalent notions of scientific freedom, the geoengineering re-
search agenda should be determined by governments, not sci-
entists or private funders lacking public accountability.336 Na-
tions should coordinate research efforts, whether through 
existing international organizations, ad hoc agreements, or the 
establishment of nonbinding guidelines that may influence re-
search agendas.337 Ultimately, the goal-oriented nature of 
 
 332. Olson, supra note 210, at 30. The Royal Society report on 
geoengineering similarly advocates that CDR research prioritize those meth-
ods “that remove atmospheric CO2 without affecting other natural systems 
and which do not require large-scale land-use changes.” ROYAL SOC’Y, supra 
note 28, at 61. 
 333. Olson, supra note 210, at 30. 
 334. See id. at 30–33. 
 335. See id. at 37–38. 
 336. See Long & Scott, supra note 150, at 50 (recommending that 
geoengineering research be conducted in a “collaborative mission-driven” 
manner rather than an “investigator-driven” manner). 
 337. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., NANOSAFETY AT THE 
OECD: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS 2006–2010, at 7–12 (2011) (summarizing efforts 
by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to 
coordinate environmental, health, and safety research on nanomaterials); 
Bodansky, supra note 21, at 543 (observing that decisions by international in-
stitutions, while binding only on states, can affect decisions by funding agen-
cies or scientists). 
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geoengineering research calls for a strategic yet accountable 
approach developed through public engagement and delibera-
tion. Through technology assessment, funding decisions, and 
direct oversight, governments can steer the scientific communi-
ty toward investigating options meriting further inquiry. 
3. Institute Safeguards Against Systemic Concerns 
As the public reactions to the SPICE and Haida field trials 
reflect, even modest experiments can represent symbolically 
important commitments along a path that has not received ad-
equate public consideration. A programmatic technology as-
sessment can serve as a vehicle for initiating public considera-
tion and setting research priorities. Such an assessment would 
not provide definitive and permanent answers regarding how to 
proceed, however. As research advances, assessment should be 
ongoing, taking into account new information. Lock-in and oth-
er systemic concerns will continue to be at issue, and govern-
ments can take concrete measures in response. Measures to 
consider include a moratorium on field research or full-scale 
deployment, as well as the development of a diverse portfolio of 
options for combating climate change. 
a. A Moratorium on Field Research?  
One option for combating lock-in and moral hazard is to 
limit or prohibit field research. A technology cannot become 
locked in, and is unlikely to undermine climate mitigation ef-
forts, if it remains an abstract notion. A blanket ban on 
geoengineering field research is improbable, however. Through 
the LC/LP and CBD regimes, the international community has 
already decided that certain types of geoengineering field re-
search may be authorized, subject to specific conditions. Moreo-
ver, key nations would likely oppose a ban on field experimen-
tation. The British government sponsored the SPICE project, 
for example, and Russia has conducted field research to meas-
ure the effect of aerosols on sunlight.338 In the United States, 
President Obama’s chief scientific advisor once declared that 
geoengineering has “got to be looked at” as an option for re-
sponding to climate change.339 And while China has not an-
 
 338. See Martin Lukacs et al., Russia Urges UN Climate Report To Include 
Geoengineering, GUARDIAN (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
environment/2013/sep/19/russia-un-climate-report-geoengineering. 
 339. See Alok Jha, Obama Climate Adviser Open to Geo-engineering To 
Tackle Global Warming, GUARDIAN (Apr. 8, 2009), http://www.theguardian 
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nounced an official position on geoengineering, it lists the sub-
ject as an Earth science research priority and faces strong in-
centives to promote SRM research and its eventual use.340 A 
broad ban on geoengineering field research would encounter 
opposition not only from powerful nations but also from would-
be researchers.341 Indeed, effective enforcement of a ban may 
not be possible, as some researchers might characterize their 
work in such a way as to circumvent a ban or relocate their pro-
jects to jurisdictions where no ban applies.342 
In contrast to a broad prohibition on field experimentation, 
which might limit research that neither raises systemic con-
cerns nor poses physical risks, more narrowly tailored re-
strictions can address concerns associated with specific tech-
niques. The fierce reaction to the SPICE project, for instance, 
reveals the need to engage the public and grapple with broader 
concerns prior to field experiments on stratospheric aerosol re-
lease. A moratorium on field research in this area would buy 
time for the international community—and scientists—to at-
tend to these concerns in a more satisfactory manner. The 
course followed by recombinant DNA researchers four decades 
ago, notwithstanding the shortcomings of the 1975 Asilomar 
conference, offers a model for stimulating governance of re-
search in new technologies.343 Namely, an explicit moratorium 
on stratospheric aerosol field experiments—whether self-
imposed or government-based—could create room and support 
 
.com/environment/2009/apr/08/geo-engineering-john-holdren. The advisor, 
John Holdren, later clarified that such comments reflected his personal views 
rather than official policy. See Andrew C. Revkin, Science Advisor Lays Out 
Climate and Energy Plans, DOT EARTH (Apr. 9, 2009), http://dotearth 
.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/09/science-adviser-lists-goals-on-climate-energy. 
 340. See Kingsley Edney & Jonathan Symons, China and the Blunt Temp-
tations of Geo-Engineering: The Role of Solar Radiation Management in Chi-
na’s Strategic Response to Climate Change, 27 PAC. REV. 307, 309–10, 325 
(2014) (“China may be unusually susceptible to the ‘blunt temptations’ of geo-
engineering: it is politically dependent on maintaining rapid economic growth, 
conceptualizes climate change as a form of environmental imperialism, is a 
self-proclaimed leader of developing countries and possesses a large landmass 
and an unrivalled existing weather manipulation programme that would ena-
ble unilateral implementation of SRM.”); see also Clive Hamilton, Why 
Geoengineering Has Immediate Appeal to China, GUARDIAN (Mar. 22, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/mar/22/geoengineering-china 
-climate-change. 
 341. See Parson & Keith, supra note 16; Rayner et al., supra note 56. 
 342. See Marchant & Pope, supra note 45, at 381 (discussing the potential 
for scientists to relocate). 
 343. See supra Part I.C. 
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for a programmatic technology assessment that ideally would 
engage a wide range of stakeholders and the broader public.344  
b. A Moratorium on Deployment 
Although this Article focuses on the governance of 
geoengineering research, not deployment, an international 
moratorium on geoengineering deployment could contribute in 
several ways to more effective governance of geoengineering re-
search. First, a moratorium on geoengineering deployment 
would counter the risk of lock-in.345 Such a moratorium would 
expressly affirm that no decision to deploy geoengineering has 
been made. As long as a moratorium remains in place, deliber-
ate action by the international community—or blatant violation 
of the moratorium—would be required for deployment to occur. 
Second, if its terms are sufficiently strong, a moratorium on 
deployment might also allay moral hazard concerns. To be sure, 
a temporary, short-term moratorium would do little to counter 
the potential for geoengineering to be perceived as a substitute 
for mitigation. But a more permanent moratorium or an out-
right prohibition of specific geoengineering techniques “could 
serve as a political signal that emission reductions are the de-
fault climate policy.”346 Third, a moratorium on deployment 
could simplify the process of developing a research governance 
regime. Governance of geoengineering deployment would have 
to grapple with contentious issues such as whether to 
geoengineer, how and when to do so, and how to make these 
decisions.347 As critical as these issues may eventually be, 
reaching agreement on them in the near term may be impossi-
ble. Close consideration of these issues would necessitate all 
manner of speculation regarding geoengineering techniques 
 
 344. David Keith, a leading proponent of geoengineering research, has 
stated that “[t]aking a few years to have some of the debate happen is healthi-
er than rushing ahead with an experiment.” Geoengineering: Lift-Off, ECONO-
MIST, Nov. 6, 2010, at 99, 102. 
 345. See Zürn & Schäfer, supra note 157 (recommending “a time-limited 
moratorium” on field testing “[t]o limit the risk of a slippery slope effect”). 
 346. BODLE ET AL., supra note 21, at 135; cf. Parson & Ernst, supra note 
32, at 336 (suggesting that announcements by states that they are provisional-
ly suspending the right to deploy geoengineering “would soothe alarm about 
rapid, unilateral, or reckless pursuit” of geoengineering and “create stronger 
incentives to negotiate serious measures on emissions” by “implying a poten-
tial future threat to proceed with [geoengineering] under certain conditions”). 
 347. See Albert C. Lin, Geoengineering Governance, 8 ISSUES LEGAL 
SCHOLARSHIP, No. 3, 2009, at 1, 21, 24; Lin, supra note 218, at 176. 
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and hazards as well as future climate conditions.348 A moratori-
um on deployment would bracket these issues and concentrate 
policy makers’ attention on more pressing and concrete matters 
of research governance. 
While some commentators argue for an absolute ban—and 
not just a moratorium—on geoengineering deployment,349 a ban 
could go too far in discouraging research and development. A 
“prohibition of geoengineering activities as a general rule com-
bined with exceptions under well-defined circumstances” offers 
a perhaps less problematic and more politically feasible ap-
proach.350 As proposed in a report prepared for Germany’s Fed-
eral Environmental Agency (Umweltbundesamt), such an ap-
proach would contemplate a mandatory permit for field 
experiments and other research activities and allow for the de-
velopment of additional exceptions over time.351 In any case, 
whether the international community establishes a formal pro-
hibition on deployment may make little practical difference in 
the immediate future. There already exists a general consensus 
that geoengineering deployment should not occur in the near 
term.352 Indeed, the LC/LP and CBD pronouncements both take 
a position against geoengineering deployment and arguably are 
evidence of a nascent international norm in that regard.353  
c. Diversification  
Developing a diverse geoengineering research portfolio 
would be sensible for a number of reasons, including the allevi-
ation of systemic concerns. Great uncertainty surrounds the ef-
fectiveness and acceptability of each geoengineering technique. 
Diversification offers resilience in coping with these uncertain-
ties as well as uncertainties regarding the consequences of cli-
mate change.354 Diversification also responds to the inability of 
 
 348. See BODLE ET AL., supra note 21, at 125 (“Regulation of research pre-
sents a natural first, and likely easier, step prior to consideration of deploy-
ment.”). 
 349. E.g., ETC GRP., THE CASE FOR TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: 
GEOENGINEERING (2012), http://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/ 
files/TAF7_Geoengineering_042612.pdf. 
 350. BODLE ET AL., supra note 21, at 135. 
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 352. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 52, at 13; ROYAL 
SOC’Y, supra note 28, at 57; Rayner et al., supra note 56. 
 353. See supra Part I.B. 
 354. See Andy Stirling, Direction, Distribution, and Diversity! Pluralising 
Progress in Innovation, Sustainability and Development 25–26 (Soc., Tech. & 
Envtl. Pathways to Sustainability, Working Paper No. 32, 2009), http://steps 
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any single geoengineering technique to tackle all climate con-
cerns, even if technical challenges are resolved. As noted earli-
er, ocean fertilization could sequester no more than a modest 
fraction of annual anthropogenic carbon emissions, and SRM 
techniques would do nothing to combat ocean acidification.355 
Importantly, diversification also counters the economic, po-
litical, and social forces that contribute to lock-in.356 Investing 
in a variety of options makes it less likely that any one option 
will become dominant and lowers the barriers to switching 
away from a technology whose selection turns out to have been 
mistaken.357 Furthermore, if alternative technologies are viable, 
politicians, firms, and other stakeholders are less likely to be 
vested in establishing and continuing with a particular tech-
nology.358 Cultivating alternatives also serves an important ex-
pressive function by declaring publicly that policy makers have 
not chosen to deploy any specific geoengineering technique. 
Opening up the appraisal of geoengineering alternatives would 
ideally be part of a broader process in which society develops a 
diverse set of options for addressing climate change—and not 
just a diverse set of geoengineering options.359 Situating 
geoengineering within the broader context of an overall climate 
response strategy would facilitate useful comparisons, reduce 
the systemic risks of lock-in and moral hazard, and perhaps ac-
commodate fundamentally divergent perspectives regarding 
risk, science, and society.360 
Insulated from competition and backed by politically pow-
erful forces, government research institutions tend to become 
committed to a narrow course of action.361 To reduce the risk of 
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 357. See Cairns, supra note 182, at 651. 
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36, 845–46 (discussing lock-in of nuclear reprocessing technology in the United 
Kingdom as alternative technological options were eliminated). 
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lock-in, a research diversification strategy should distribute 
grants to a range of researchers, including those outside gov-
ernment. Funding programs should balance competing inter-
ests in incentivizing research and avoiding entrenchment of 
specific techniques. While funding must be sufficient to attract 
the interest of the scientific community, large and long-term 
commitments can create political and economic constituencies 
that lock in favored technologies.362 Limited grants and short-
term contracts, combined with a diverse research portfolio, can 
preserve the space for society to make deliberate decisions re-
garding whether to proceed with a technology. 
A strategy of diversification would not be costless.363 It 
could slow the development of a specific geoengineering tech-
nique by diluting support. In addition, such a strategy could 
exacerbate the moral hazard problem if it fosters the mistaken 
impression that there are many possible technological fixes for 
climate change. Notwithstanding these concerns, a diversified 
approach can buy time for society to debate how or whether to 
proceed with geoengineering. Notably, a diversification strategy 
need not fund all techniques on an equal basis. Rather, it 
should prioritize research into those techniques that are less 
problematic in terms of their physical and systemic risks. 
  CONCLUSION   
Amid growing scientific interest in geoengineering field ex-
perimentation, rising public discomfort with geoengineering re-
search has stymied open and responsible field trials. Such ex-
perimentation could yield valuable information regarding the 
viability of geoengineering techniques and diffuse the pressure 
to conduct rogue field tests. Establishing a governance regime 
for geoengineering research can address the deadlock, but such 
a regime must consider more than the physical risks of field 
experimentation. Geoengineering research governance also 
must analyze and address systemic concerns of lock-in, moral 
hazard, and increased risk of conflict, for these concerns lie at 
the heart of the unease that geoengineering field research en-
genders.  
 
turally diverse set of research and management efforts”); cf. Walker, supra 
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To gain the public’s trust, governance must be independ-
ent, transparent, participatory, and accountable. And to effec-
tively oversee the hazards of geoengineering research, govern-
ance must draw on a wide range of expertise and be compre-
hensive and reflexive. In pursuit of these goals, the U.S. 
government should initiate an ongoing programmatic technolo-
gy assessment and invite the input of stakeholders and the 
general public. Such an assessment can serve as a foundation 
for establishing an oversight system for individual field exper-
iments. A programmatic assessment can also inform policies to 
prioritize research into techniques involving lesser systemic 
and physical risks and to incorporate safeguards against these 
risks. 
